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I. INTRODUCTION: SURVEILLANCE IS FOR EVERYONE
Today, everyone is watched. While surveillance is not new,
"mass surveillance" is a relatively recent phenomenon. The main-
streaming of surveillance has helped spark an anti-surveillance, pro-
privacy movement that extends across legal scholarship, policy de-
bates, civil rights advocacy, political discourse, and public conscious-
ness. Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations about the breadth and
depth of government spying unleashed a global conversation about
surveillance that shows no signs yet of abating.' Academics, legal
experts, journalists, and activists chum out reports, studies, and arti-
cles detailing the harmful effects of surveillance on privacy and the
2
need for robust privacy protections. Privacy dominates the agenda of
countless symposia, conferences, and workshops. The topic is even
the eponymous subject of a theater production starring Daniel Rad-
cliffe of "Harry Potter" fame.3
For those who have long advocated for a thoughtful and robust
theory of privacy, this is mass surveillance's silver lining. The fact
that surveillance now targets privileged members of society along
with marginalized populations has unleashed the political will to chal-
lenge it. As Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Senior Counsel to the Bren-
nan Center's Liberty and National Security Program, observes, the
"hidden blessing" of revelations about the extent and reach of mass
government surveillance is that "majorities are opposed to surveil-
1. A Google search of the terms '"Edward Snowden' & privacy" yields nearly three mil-
lion results as of August 2015. A July 2016 search of "Edward Snowden" in the Westlaw
legal database under "Law Reviews and Journals" yields more than 600 results, an impres-
sive number for a time period that spans not even three full years. See also Mark Mazzetti
and Michael S. Schmidt, Officials Say U.S. May Never Know Extent of Snowden 's Leaks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/us/officials-say-us-may-
never-know-extent-of-snowdens-leaks.html [https://perma.cc/NH9J-43AX] ("Mr. Snow-
den's disclosures set off a national debate about the expansion of the N.S.A.'s powers to spy
both at home and abroad.").
2. See Part II, infra.
3. Alexis Soloski, Is Nothing Secret? Daniel Radclhffe and the Art of Privacy', N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/theater/daniel-radcliffe-
privacy.html [https://perma.cc/Z5E4-Q79B].
4. Privacy is of course a highly contested concept. There is great disagreement not only
among scholars but also the general public about how to define privacy. That is not the
focus of this Article. This Article does not attempt to resolve the controversy over the defi-
nition of privacy and accepts that privacy can be defined in multiple ways. The very general
definition of privacy on which this Article loosely relies is the right of individuals to decide
for themselves if, when, and how intimate information about them should be made available
to others.
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lance when 'average Americans' are the target. In addition to aver-
age Americans, elites too are learning how mass surveillance affects
their interests: "major tech companies have lost overseas busi-
ness over fears that they are sharing their customers' private infor-
mation with the government, and could lose more. U.S. senators -
not usually the subjects of government surveillance - are also seeing
their communications captured." 6
The pro-privacy narrative that has emerged in the wake of this in-
creasingly democratic surveillance is accordingly an occasion for both
praise and criticism. Derrick Bell's interest convergence theory of the
anti-discrimination movement of the 1950s and 1960s offers useful
insights into the contemporary anti-surveillance movement. Accord-
ing to Bell, white support of racial equality goals extended only so far
as those goals served the interests of or at least did not conflict with
those of whites.8 When the interests of whites and blacks diverged,
white support for racial equality disappeared.9 This fact, Bell sug-
gests, demonstrates that white support of racial equality was funda-
mentally indifferent to the harms that racial inequality imposes on
blacks.1o Remedies for racial equality are instead likely "the outward
manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious judicial conclu-
sions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not
harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class
whites." 1
The contemporary pro-privacy, anti-surveillance movement is
similarly limited by interest convergence. The movement is not pri-
marily concerned with the harms imposed on the most vulnerable
members of society, but rather with threats to mainstream and elite
interests. Surveillance and other privacy violations that were largely
tolerated so long as they burdened marginalized groups are challenged
now that they affect privileged interests. This kind of interest conver-
gence in privacy will result not in privacy reform across the board, but
primarily in privacy reform that will protect, or at least not harm, the
most powerful groups. As the contemporary privacy movement is still
evolving, it is an opportune time to evaluate its strengths and limita-
tions.
5. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, How the NYPD Became George Orwell's Worst Night-
mare, SALON (May 12, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/05/12/how-the-
nypd became georgeorwells worst nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/975N-378P].
6. Id.
7. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523 (1980).
8. See id. at 522-523.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 523-524.
11. Id. at 523.
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With regard to its strengths, the popular privacy narrative rightly
emphasizes two important and historically under-recognized insights:
first, invasions of privacy have devastating effects on the human per-
sonality, and second, consent to reveal private information is always
contextual. Current privacy scholarship and advocacy provide exten-
sive accounts of the pernicious effects of state intrusion into private
livesl2 and criticize the use of formalistic conceptions of consent to
serve as a blanket justification for greater and greater encroachments
upon privacy.1 3 These insights are vital to the preservation of a mean-
ingful concept of privacy.
But while the widespread concern about surveillance and subse-
quent defense of privacy is in many ways a positive development, it is
severely limited by selective origins. Mass resistance to surveillance
emerged only when average and elite individuals became the targets
of surveillance, and their the interests and viewpoints now dominate
the contemporary narrative about privacy. The contemporary anti-
surveillance movement has done too little to acknowledge the
longstanding surveillance of marginalized populations and has given
too little thought to what that history means for the future of privacy.
By largely ignoring the history of surveillance, focusing on data pri-
vacy to the exclusion of other privacy concerns, and failing to ade-
quately recognize the threat to privacy posed by non-state actors, the
popular privacy movement undermines its own revolutionary possibil-
ities.
Long before the government began collecting phone metadata and
mining Big Data, entire segments of society were subjected to inva-
sive forms of surveillance that inhibited their rights to free expression,
movement, and association. In particular, the surveillance of African-
Americans, the poor, and women has been tolerated - even encour-
aged - by mainstream society and justified by rationales ranging
from maintaining public order'4 to reinforcing the natural order. 15 The
practices of slavery and its enduring after-effects, from racial classifi-
cation laws to mass incarceration, require extensive and intimate state
invasions of privacy of black bodies. The poor, often quite literally
unable to shield themselves from the gaze of the state, have been sub-
jected to ruthless investigation and regulation in matters ranging from
12. See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE (2011); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy
Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,
126 HARV. L. REv. 1934 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffery
Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2041 (2001); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal
Prospectus and the Threat ofA Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1186
(2011).
14. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning
of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
15. See, for example, anti-miscegenation and anti-contraception laws.
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childrearing to housing arrangements. Women's second-class status as
citizens - imposed through centuries of legal and social inequality in
marriage, education, employment, and reproduction- entailed state
scrutiny and control of their most private decisions. For those whose
lives are intersected by multiple forms of subordination, for example,
poor black women, surveillance is a particularly complex and oppres-
sive reality. The extensive and disruptive reach of surveillance into
the lives of marginalized populations has largely gone unremarked in
the current popular privacy narrative.
The second limitation of the current privacy narrative, closely re-
lated to the first, is the outsized focus on matters of informational pri-
vacy. Concerns over online tracking, data breaches, and GPS monitor-
monitoring dominate surveillance discourse.' 6 While these invasions
of privacy are troubling, they pale in comparison to those routinely
inflicted upon marginalized groups, including the physical harassment
and brutality young black men suffer at the hands of police, the scru-
tiny and criminalization of everyday activities by homeless individu-
als, and the epidemic of sexual assault and harassment of women
generally and domestic violence victims in particular. While mass
surveillance by its nature affects greater numbers of people than tar-
geted surveillance, it also tends to engender greater and more effective
resistance. Targeted surveillance of marginalized groups, by contrast,
generates less enthusiasm and opportunities for effective resistance.
What is more, surveillance based on pernicious and illegitimate preju-
dices towards certain groups inflicts discriminatory social harms on
society in addition to individual harms. Focusing reform and re-
sistance primarily on informational privacy interests obscures other,
more insidious, forms of surveillance.
The third limitation of the dominant privacy narrative is its nar-
row focus on the government as the primary threat to privacy and the
primary source of surveillance. While the government's powers of
surveillance are formidable, they are now inextricably tied to the pri-
vate sector. The distinction between state and private actors is increas-
ingly more theoretical than actual: the technology that makes mass
surveillance possible was developed through collaboration between
the government and private corporations, and the surveillance powers
of the state are increasingly exercised through private technology.
Cell phone carriers, social media applications, and search engines
function as huge information reservoirs for the government, and many
of these entities are more than happy to hand over the intimate data of
16. See, for example, the books, conferences, and resources listed on the websites of ma-
jor privacy organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(https://www.epic.org/), the International Association of Privacy Professionals
(https://iapp.org/), and the Privacy + Security Forum
(https://privacyandsecurityforum.com/).
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their users, sometimes at a profit. What is more, an excessive focus on
the government as the primary threat to privacy also ignores the po-
tential of "social tyranny," as John Stuart Mill termed it, to wreak
more damaging and intimate havoc than state oppression.1
The rise of government surveillance and the rapid pace of techno-
logical progress have given the more privileged classes of society a
glimpse of the longstanding experiences of the less privileged classes.
This democratization of surveillance provides a unique opportunity to
democratize privacy. Now that everyone's interests are affected by
surveillance, everyone's interests must be considered in resisting sur-
veillance. By focusing on the concerns of the privileged, the privacy
movement that has emerged from these developments undermines its
own transformative potential.
Privacy reform fueled by interest convergence has two negative
consequences. The first is that - predictably - the privacy rights of
vulnerable populations continue to be diminished. The second, less
intuitive result is that the quality of privacy for everyone else is also
diminished. That is because marginalizing the experiences of those
most vulnerable to surveillance is counter-productive to anti-
surveillance goals. It is precisely those who have suffered the most,
and in multiple ways, from social and legal injustices who are best
positioned to lead the way in reforming them. Those who have expe-
rienced the harshest deprivations of privacy and the most oppressive
forms of surveillance have the deepest understandings of their dynam-
ics.
Accordingly, even those who do not care about the welfare of
disadvantaged groups for their sake should care about it for their own
sakes - an approach we might call enlightened interest conver-
gence.18 The revolutionary potential of privacy cannot be achieved
without addressing the longstanding race, gender, and class inequali-
ties that have plagued the theory and practice of privacy. A democrat-
ic conception of privacy, by emphasizing the experiences of those
most vulnerable to its violation, offers the best chance of securing
privacy for all.
Part II outlines what the contemporary popular narrative about
privacy and surveillance gets right, including the emphasis on privacy
as key to the development and flourishing of democracy and the hu-
man personality. Part III discusses the limitations of this narrative, in
particular its erasure of the history of the surveillance of marginalized
communities, its excessive focus on data privacy to the exclusion of
other forms of privacy, and its overly simplistic view of the state as
17. See infra Section II.C.1.
18. For elaboration of the concept of enlightened self-interest from which I am borrow-
ing, see ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26-27 (1976) and ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 528-29(1966).
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the enemy of privacy and the source of surveillance. Part IV introduc-
es the concept of "intersectional surveillance," which describes how
those subjected to multiple sources of subordination are also subjected
to multiple sources of surveillance, and provides specific examples
focusing on black bodies, poor bodies, and female bodies. Part V of-
fers two cautionary tales to illustrate the consequences of an undemo-
cratic, interest-convergence approach to privacy and surveillance: the
push for police body cameras and the resistance to sexual privacy leg-
islation. It also discusses the contrast between two Supreme Court
cases, Terry v. Ohio and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, to
demonstrate privacy possibilities beyond interest-convergence. Part
VI concludes by exploring how we can use the democratization of
surveillance to democratize privacy.
II. WHAT THE CONTEMPORARY PRIVACY NARRATIVE GETS
RIGHT
The contemporary anti-surveillance, pro-privacy narrative that is
the focus of this Article has emerged from an amalgam of sources:
scholars, politicians, security experts, policymakers, civil liberties
organizations, media, and social media. The "popular" privacy narra-
tive (as opposed to the academic narrative) tends to focus on the im-
pact of surveillance for the middle class and elites. The academic
privacy narrative suffers from this as well, though many scholars are
attentive to the history and practice of various privacy inequalities.1 9
The popular privacy narrative is significant because it sets the terms
of debate for the discussion of privacy and surveillance that will
have - and already has had - significant real-world consequences.
There is much to praise and much to criticize in this popular narrative.
This Part focuses on the positive: how the narrative brings to the
surface two key insights about privacy that have been submerged in
the digital age. The first insight is that invasions of privacy are inva-
sions of the human personality itself. The fear of surveillance inhibits
individual freedoms of expression and association, which in turn un-
dermines the possibility of an open and democratic society. The se-
19. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, DIGITAL DEAD END: FIGHTING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2012); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE:
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); Anita Allen,
Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1175 (2000); Khiara M. Bridges, Pri-
vacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011); Michelle Estrin
Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Gilman,
Welfare]; Michelle Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1389 (2012) [hereinafter Gilman, The Class Differential]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Synergy ofEquality and Privacy in Women's Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137 (2002).
No. 2] 43 1
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30
cond is that consent to exposure is a contextual and nuanced affair,
not an on-off switch. That is, an individual's consensual exposure of
private information to one party does not imply consent to all parties.
Privacy is not secrecy; it is the right of the individual to choose who
can access private information and who cannot.
A. Privacy and Personality
The insight that privacy is essential to the human personality and
that surveillance inhibits its flourishing has a long but uneven history
in the United States. Since the late 1800s, the popularity of this idea
has waxed and waned, approaching near obscurity in the techno-
optimism20 of the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary privacy scholar-
ship and activism has helped to revive this insight in the era of mass
surveillance.
In their famous 1890 essay, The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis wrote that the right to privacy was not to be un-
derstood as a mere property right, but as something even more foun-
dational: the right to human personality itself.21 The right to privacy is
part of the fundamental right "to be let alone" and is similar to "the
right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the
right not to be maliciously prosecuted, [and] the right not to be de-
famed."22 According to Warren and Brandeis, the right to privacy
should not be confused with a property right, but is based on an even
more foundational and absolute principle: "that of an inviolate per-
sonality .23
Brandeis continued to advocate for a deeply personal and psycho-
logical concept of privacy as a Justice of the Supreme Court. In
Olmstead v. United States, the infamous Fourth Amendment case
from 1928 in which the majority maintained that privacy was funda-
mentally concerned with tangible property, Brandeis authored a sting-
ing and influential dissent, insisting that the "makers of our
Constitution ... knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to pro-
tect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations."24
20. See Daniel Kao, The Good and Bad of Techno-Optimism in the Valley, DIPLATEEVO
(June 2015), https://www.diplateevo.com/the-good-and-bad-of-techno-optimism-in-the-
valley/ [https://perma.cc/Y8GP-NYWY] (defining techno-optimism as "a phrase used to
describe the mindset that the future is getting better due to the advances and application of
technology in all industries").
21. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196-97 (1890).
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id.
24. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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Brandeis's view was vindicated in 1967, when the Supreme Court
overruled Olmstead to find that the Fourth Amendment "protects peo-
,,25ple, not places. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United
States offered a two-part test to elaborate upon this protection: people
are protected by the Fourth Amendment when they "have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 2 6
The Court, however, soon began thinning out this conception of
privacy in cases such as United States v. White, where a plurality of
the Court ruled that evidence obtained from an informant wearing a
wire transmitter while he spoke with the defendant could be used
27
against the defendant at trial. Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting
in that case, emphasized the link between privacy and freedom of ex-
pression.28 Monitoring "kills free discourse and spontaneous utteranc-
es," he wrote, and each individual must be "the sole judge of as to
what must be said and what must remain unspoken. This is the es-
sence of the idea of privacy implicit" in the First Amendment." 29
Justice Douglas elaborated upon the relationship between privacy
and the development of the human personality by quoting former
United States Attorney General William Ramsey Clark at length:
Privacy is the basis of individuality. To be alone and
be let alone, to be with chosen company, to say what
you think, or don't think, but to say what you will, is
to be yourself ...
Few conversations would be what they are if the
speakers thought others were listening. Silly, secret,
thoughtless and thoughtful statements would be af-
fected. . . . To penetrate the last refuge of the indi-
vidual, the precious little privacy that remains, the
basis of individual dignity, can have meaning to the
quality of our lives that we cannot foresee.30
Justice Douglas's dissent highlights the fact that privacy as a con-
stitutional right is not just a matter of the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments, but also of the First and Fifth Amendments. At one
time, privacy was quite strongly associated with the Fifth Amendment
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
26. Id.
27. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971).
28. See id. at 762.
29. Id. at 762-63.
30. Id. at 763.
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privilege against self-incrimination.3' In 1964, the Supreme Court
found that the privilege "reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations," including "our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life.' 3 2
Legal scholar Arthur R. Miller's The Assault on Privacy, pub-
lished in 1971, detailed the extensive threat that technology and sur-
veillance pose to privacy. One of the many potential negative effects
of what Miller referred to as the "dossier society" was that "people
may increasingly base their decisions and fashion their behavior in
terms of enhancing their record image in the eyes of those who may
have access to it in the future."33 Miller was reacting to the fetish of
11 34
"openness" that seemed to characterize the era of new technology, a
fetish that only increased in the ensuing decades. As the Internet be-
gan to transform everything from personal communication to record-
keeping to commerce, the phrase "information wants to be free"
35became a rallying cry.
The contemporary privacy narrative has, to its great credit, redis-
covered the destructive disciplinary effects of surveillance that were
submerged during the era of techno-optimism in the 80s and 90s. 36
These insights have taken on a new urgency in recent years, triggered
in large part by the increasingly invasive surveillance measures adopt-
ed by the U.S. government post-9/11 and the measures adopted in the
global "war on terror." Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations about the
depth and breadth of United States and other government surveillance
programs pushed the question of surveillance into public view and
made the concern over privacy go viral, and not only in legal or aca-
demic circles. Countless books, law review articles, op-eds, news sto-
ries, conferences, classes, blog posts, studies, and hashtags have been
dedicated to the question of privacy in the modern age,37 most focus-
ing heavily on the facilitation of government surveillance through
technology and data mining.
In 2014, Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") published a report, With Liberty to Monitor All:
31. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 805,
809-10 (2005) (noting that "the Court's early Fifth Amendment decisions were focused on
protection of privacy").
32. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
33. ARTHUR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 50 (1971).
34. See ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE'S PLATFORM 1-10 (2014).
35. See Cory Doctorow, Saying Information Wants to be Free Does More Harm Than
Good, THE GUARDIAN (May 18, 2010, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2010/may/18/information-wants-to-be-free [https://perma.cc/M98V-PMUX].
36. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 11 (2011).
37. See Mazzetti and Schmidt, supra note 1.
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How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and
American Democracy.38 The report references Snowden's revelations
regarding U.S. spying programs, including the collection of "vast
quantities of information - known as 'metadata' - about phone
calls made to, from, and within the US. . .. [,] the content of interna-
tional chats, emails, and voice calls. . . . [, and] massive amounts of
cell phone location data," as well as "millions of images so the NSA
can run facial recognition programs" and "hundreds of millions of
",39
email and chat contact lists around the world ....
Such programs, according to the report, stifle journalists, lawyers,
and ultimately democracy itself40 Journalists interviewed for the re-
port say that surveillance programs "constrain[] their ability to inves-
tigate and report on matters of public concern, and ultimately
undermine[] democratic processes by hindering open, informed de-
bate." 41 Lawyers "expressed concern over their ability to satisfy their
professional duty of confidentiality, maintain their attorney-client re-
lationships, and effectively represent their clients."4 2 The report as-
serts, "Everyone has the right to communicate with an expectation of
privacy, including privacy from unwarranted or indiscriminate sur-
veillance by governments. This right . . . is essential not just to indi-
vidual freedom of expression, but to the fair and accountable
functioning of a democracy."43
In January 2014, the PEN American Center, the largest branch of
the literary and human rights organization PEN International, pub-
lished a report titled Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass Surveil-
44lance on International Writers. One of the report's key findings was
that "writers around the world are engaging in self-censorship due to
fear of surveillance." According to the report, "40% of U.S. writers
surveyed by PEN in October 2013 reported curtailing or avoiding ac-
tivities on social media, or seriously considered doing so"; 33% "de-
liberately steered clear of certain topics in personal phone
", 47
conversations or email messages, or seriously considered doing so";
38. G. Alex Sinha & Aryeh Neier, With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US
Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 28, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/28/liberty-monitor-all/how-
large-scale-us-surveillance-harming-journalism-law-and [https://perma.cc/W3HC-S5HJ].
39. Id.
40. See id.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. PEN AMERICAN CENTER, GLOBAL CHILLING: THE IMPACT OF MASS SURVEILLANCE
ON INTERNATIONAL WRITERS 1 (2015), http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/
globalchilling_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE7Y-Q4TY].
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 11.
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and 27% "refrained from conducting internet searches or visiting
websites on topics that may be considered controversial or suspicious,
or seriously considered doing so."
A 2014 Harris poll found that nearly half of all respondents (43%)
had "changed their online behavior and think more carefully about
where they go, what they say, and what they do online" in the wake of
the National Security Agency [("NSA")] revelations, including 26%
doing less banking online, 24% less inclined to use email, and 26%
doing less online shopping. 49 A 2016 study published in the Journal-
ism & Mass Communication Quarterly found empirical evidence that
"the government's online surveillance programs may threaten the dis-
closure of minority views and contribute to the reinforcement of ma-
jority opinion."5 0 All of these reports and surveys seem to reinforce
the Deputy Legal Director of the ACLU Jameel Jaffer's statement in
the New York Times: "The chilling effect of surveillance makes our
public debates narrower and more inhibited and our democracy less
vital." 5 Several legal scholars have offered similar conclusions about
the harmful impact of surveillance on individual autonomy and ex-
pression. Neil Richards, for example, argues that surveillance is harm-
ful because it can "chill the exercise of our civil liberties....
[S]urveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and com-
municating with others in order to make up their minds about political
and social issues. . . . is especially dangerous because it can cause
people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas."52
Julie Cohen maintains that privacy "shelters dynamic, emergent sub-
jectivity from the efforts of commercial and government actors to
render individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and predicta-
ble."53 This focus on privacy's importance for the human personality,
and on the inhibiting and disciplinary effects of privacy invasions, is
both important and necessary in the new surveillance era.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Stephen Cobb, New Harris Poll Shows NSA Revelations Impact Online Shopping,
Banking, and More, WELIVESECURITY (April 2, 2014), http://www.welivesecurity.com/
2014/04/02/harris-poll-nsa-revelations-impact-online-shopping-banking/
[https://perma.cc/6MA4-WS7K].
50. Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook 's Spiral ofSilence Ef-
fects in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring, JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 296, 307
(2016).
51. Jameel Jaffer, Eric Posner & Joshua Foust, Is the N.S.A. Surveillance Threat Real or
Imagined?, N.Y. TiMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/
09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-imagined [https://perma.cc/6VTW-KHF8].
52. Neil Richards, The Dangers ofSurveillance, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1934, 1935 (2013).
53. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1905.
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B. The Context of Consent
The other key insight rehabilitated by the contemporary surveil-
lance narrative concerns the contextual nature of consent. In The As-
sault on Privacy, Miller explained how formalistic and absolutist
understandings of consent are used to counter invasion of privacy
-54
claims. If a person engaged "in activity inconsistent with a desire to
maintain his privacy" or "consented to the dissemination of personal
information," the argument goes, then he has not truly experienced an
invasion of privacy. This attitude has been clearly displayed in the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the 1970s,
and it is one that many contemporary privacy scholars and activists
are actively attempting to resist.
As mentioned above, a plurality in United States v. White found
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily relayed to another party, despite being un-
aware that the third party was wearing a wire. 6 Similarly, in the 1976
case United States v. Miller, the Court found that a defendant who had
voluntarily turned over his financial information to his bank extin-
guished his expectation of privacy in that information. 7 In Smith v.
Maryland, the Court found that people have no legitimate expectation
of privacy in telephone numbers they dial, as these numbers are avail-
able to and recorded by telephone companies. In California v.
Greenwood, the Court found that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in trash left out for garbage collection.59 In these and several
other cases, the Court developed what has come to be known as the
third party doctrine, which holds that a person retains no expectation
of privacy in information made available to another party. This doc-
trine has also been characterized as equating privacy with secrecy:6o
retaining a constitutionally protected right to privacy in information
requires keeping that information completely secret.
The rationale for the third party doctrine rests on a highly formal-
istic conception of consent that has become even more formalistic
over time. In cases such as White, the Court was able to point to the
fact that the defendants had freely and deliberately chosen to disclose
54. See MILLER, supra note 33, at 185-186.
55. Id. at 185.
56. See supra Section I.A.
57. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-45 (1976).
58. See Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1978).
59. See Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41, 43 (1988).
60. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2002) ("In a
variety of legal contexts, the view of privacy as secrecy often leads to the conclusion that
once a fact is divulged in public, no matter how limited or narrow the disclosure, it can no
longer remain private.").
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information to third parties.6 ' But in Miller, Smith, and Greenwood,
the disclosures could not be said to be more than nominally consensu-
al. As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Miller, "[flor all
practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of
their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional. It is impossi-
ble to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a bank account."62 Justice Marshall voiced a similar ob-
jection in Smith v. Maryland, where he asserted that "privacy is not a
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited busi-
ness purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes."63 Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Greenwood, pointed out that Greenwood was required by a county
ordinance to dispose of his trash on the curb. What is more, Justice
Brennan noted, "the voluntary relinquishment of possession or control
over an effect does not necessarily amount to a relinquishment of a
privacy expectation in it.", If privacy really were the same thing as
secrecy, "a letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment pro-
tection when placed in a mailbox or other depository with the 'express
purpose' of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier."6 6
The rejection of privacy-as-secrecy arguably underpins Katz itself,
holding what an individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 6 7
In The Assault on Privacy, Miller similarly criticizes the idea that
nominal consent destroys a reasonable expectation of privacy. Miller
noted that a key problem with the "consent defense" is that it tends to
overlook the coercive pressures often involved in transactions that
68
expose individuals' private information. Miller contended that
"[w]hether a particular disclosure really is voluntary obviously de-
pends on the circumstances surrounding it, as well as the individual's
,,69personality and chemistry.
This sophisticated view of consent and the sensitivity to its con-
textual nature, like the insights into the negative impact of surveil-
lance, receded in the era of techno-optimism. As technology raced
ahead of the comprehension of its consequences, increasingly lengthy
and complex contracts regarding the use of private information be-
came common, contracts that virtually no one reads before accept-
61. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749-752 (1970).
62. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. See Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 55.
66. Id.
67. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68. See MILLER, supra note 33, at 185-86.
69. Id. at 186.
43 8
Democratic Surveillance
70
ing. Consent was increasingly "aggregated": the acceptance of use
of information in one context became acceptance of use in very dif-
ferent contexts. Formal -what at least one scholar would called "fic-
tional"7  consent to terms and conditions of Internet use, retail
purchases, social media products, and government services became
the basis on which to justify aggregating and redistributing infor-
72
mation about users on a scale few had anticipated.
The emerging popular privacy narrative has highlighted the con-
textual nature of consent and begun to push back against the idea that
privacy equals secrecy. This can be seen in Justice Sotomayor's con-
curring opinion in United States v. Jones, a case involving the war-
rantless placement by law enforcement of a GPS tracking device on a
vehicle. Justice Sotomayor considers that the time may have come to
rethink the third-party doctrine of United States v. Miller and its ilk:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in information voluntarily disclosed to third par-
ties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of car-
rying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular pro-
viders; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail ad-
dresses with which they correspond to their Internet
service providers; and the books, groceries, and med-
ications they purchase to online retailers. . . . I for
one doubt that people would accept without com-
plaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last
week, or month, or year.... I would not assume that
all information voluntarily disclosed to some mem-
ber of the public for a limited purpose is, for that rea-
son alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
-73protection.
Justice Sotomayor here emphasizes the significance of context
with regard to voluntary disclosures of information. Professor Helen
70. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure ofMandated Disclo-
sure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
71. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise ofModularity and the Waning
of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006).
72. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, NetworkAccountability for the Domes-
tic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011).
73. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). But
see Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009).
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Nissenbaum coined the term contextual integrity to describe the key
to preserving privacy. Nissenbaum defines contextual integrity as
"compatibility with presiding norms of information appropriateness
and distribution," specifying that privacy violations should be as-
sessed according to multiple factors, including "the nature of the sit-
uation or context; the nature of the information in relation to that
context; the roles of agents in receiving information; their relation-
ships to information subjects; on what terms the information is shared
by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination." 7 5 Professor
Daniel Solove urges privacy law to directly confront questions of con-
sent:
What does consenting to something really mean?
What should the law recognize as valid consent?
Many transactions occur with some kind of inequali-
ty in knowledge and power. When are these asym-
metries so substantial as to be coercive? The law's
current view of consent is incoherent, and the law
treats consent as a simple binary (that is, it either ex-
ists or it does not). Consent is far more nuanced, and
privacy law needs a new approach that accounts for
the nuances without getting too complex to be work-
able.76
The contemporary privacy narrative's emphasis on the complexities
of consent is an urgently needed corrective in the age of rapidly ad-
vancing technology.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY PRIVACY
NARRATIVE
The foregoing demonstrates how the contemporary narrative
about surveillance has resurfaced two important insights about the
nature of privacy: first, surveillance is harmful because of its discipli-
nary impact on human personality and democratic association; se-
cond, equating privacy with secrecy overlooks the importance of
contextual consent. This has been accomplished, however, in a way
generally inattentive to how this disciplinary impact of surveillance
and the equation of privacy with secrecy affect - and have always
affected - marginalized populations far more intimately and destruc-
74. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119, 155
(2004).
75. Id.
76. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HAR. L. REv. 1880, 1901 (2013).
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tively than mainstream society. As Derrick Bell argued with regard to
racial equality, the interests and experiences of those who suffer the
most harm are considered the least.7 7 The attention paid to the effects
of privacy violations on the human personality and the contextual na-
ture of consent is highly selective. The privacy narrative emphasizes
the experiences of relatively privileged members of society, which
produces a distorted picture of the history, theory, and practice of sur-
veillance. This Part addresses three flaws in this narrative that have
particularly negative consequences for the future of privacy: 1) the
erasure of marginalized individuals' longstanding experiences of sur-
veillance; 2) an outsized emphasis on data privacy to the exclusion of
other forms of privacy; and 3) an unjustifiably narrow focus on the
state as the primary threat to privacy.
A. Erasing Histories ofSurveillance: Marginalized Bodies
The surveillance of marginalized populations has a long and trou-
bling history. Race, class, and gender have all helped determine who
is watched in society, and the right to privacy has been unequally dis-
tributed according to the same factors. If the current privacy move-
ment is genuinely concerned about the harms of surveillance, it should
focus on the experiences of those individuals who have suffered under
it the most. The surveillance of marginalized bodies is key to under-
standing the history and the lessons of surveillance.
1. Black Bodies
The institution of slavery imposed wide-ranging and diverse
harms that can be understood in many ways, from physical cruelty to
entrenchment of racism to economic appropriation. Slavery is less
often described in terms of its destructive effects on human privacy,
but the description is no less true for that. Beyond obvious brutality
and dehumanization, slavery entailed the routine inspection and expo-
sure of black bodies. The bodies of slaves were constantly monitored
through investigations of their fitness for work, the sexual assault of
female slaves, and beatings of both male and female slaves. Families
were routinely split up, denying enslaved individuals the freedom of
intimate association and ability to care for their children - freedoms
later recognized in American jurisprudence as essential to the concept
of privacy.79 Sexual assault deprived female slaves of the possibility
77. See Bell, supra note 7, at 523-24.
78. One exception is DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 32 (1995).
79. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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of reproductive control, forcing them to gestate and bear the children
of white masters while prohibiting them from engaging in consensual
intimacy and reproduction. 0 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 legalized
the monitoring and pursuit of African-Americans who escaped their
slaveholders, stripping away even the most basic opportunities for
self-determination.8 '
The abolition of slavery brought with it new methods of control
over black bodies. Racial classification laws, segregation laws, anti-
miscegenation laws, and adoption laws all served not only to brutalize
and subordinate African-Americans but also to keep them under con-
stant regulation.82 The slightest rumor of impropriety could lead to
beatings, property damage, or lynching.83 The actions of black people,
especially any actions perceived as affecting white interests, were ag-
gressively scrutinized and subject to violent discipline.
In the modem era, mass incarceration provides extensive oppor-
tunities to monitor and control the bodies of prisoners, a population
that is overwhelmingly made up of black men. In prison, bodies are
literally stripped, examined, and subject to routine inspections. Beat-
ings by other inmates or by guards are common, and sexual assaults
are frequent. No true privacy exists for intimate activities, and there
87is little or no space for decisional privacy - that is, almost no op-
portunity to exert control over how and when one associates with oth-
ers or how to spend one's time. The effects of incarceration persist
long after a sentence has been served, often entailing years of moni-
80. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 22-55 (1997); Zanita E. Fenton, An Essay on Slavery's Hidden
Legacy: Social Hysteria and Structural Condonation ofIncest, 55 HOWARD L.J. 319, 331-
32 (2012).
81. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE-CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 121 (1968).
82. See Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor, Introduction to LOVING V.
VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 1, 1-2
(Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds. 2012).
83. See generally IDA B. WELLS, SOUTHERN HORRORS AND OTHER WRITINGS: THE
ANTI-LYNCHING CAMPAIGN OF IDA B. WELLS 1892-1900 (Jacqueline Jones Royster ed.,
1997).
84. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).
85. While it is true that some forms of surveillance in prisons are significantly different in
kind from surveillance outside of prisons, particularly those that are conducted for safety
purposes, the harm of the privacy invasion is still significant.
86. See Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel Like A Woman, or Why Punishment Is A Drag,
61 UCLA L. REV. 568, 572 (2014).
87. See Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fixfor Abortion Law: Reflections
on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 419, 440 (1995)
("Decisional privacy can be understood as the liberty, freedom or autonomy to make choic-
es about one's own life, minimally constrained by unwanted government or other outside
interference.").
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toring by the state through conditions of probation and severely con-
straining professional, educational, intimate, and civic opportunities.88
Today, the black population is subject to extensive, literal, daily
policing in many cities across the United States. From disproportion-
ate uses of force in police encounters to frequent stops and frisks,
black bodies are under constant suspicion and scrutiny. This extends
beyond state actors to private citizens, from "subway vigilantes" like
Bernhard Goetz, who shot four unarmed young black men after they
demanded five dollars, 89 to "neighborhood watchmen" like George
Zimmerman, who stalked and ultimately killed a young, black, un-
armed teenager named Trayvon Martin.90 Young black men and
women are taught that their bodies are considered threats in them-
selves, and that because of this they can expect to be followed, inves-
tigated, questioned, and evaluated wherever they go.91
2. Poor Bodies
In a 1991 article titled Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, Profes-
sors Robin and Robert Collin detailed the multiple ways in which
poor people are denied privacy, from housing to subsistence benefits
to reproductive choices to government searches.92 They deplored the
"commodification" of privacy that essentially treats privacy as a privi-
lege that must be paid for. The authors argued that "privacy must
mean something both more and less than money and the things that
money can buy"93 and that "the privacy we allot to poor people is a
measure of our own humanity and the withholding of privacy and
dignity is a measure of our inhumanity."94
The lack of privacy for homeless individuals is compounded by
the "criminalization of the homeless," which refers to the ways that
88. See, e.g., Molly Carney, Correction Through Omniscience: Electronic Monitoring
and the Escalation of Crime Control, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 279, 280 (2012); Reuben
Jonathan Miller & Amanda Alexander, The Price of Carceral Citizenship: Punishment,
Surveillance, and Social Welfare Policy in an Age of Carceral Expansion, 21 Mich. J. Race
& L. 291, 292 (2016).
89. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986).
90. See Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Feb. 7, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/
[https://perma.cc/S5BS-BHZ4].
91. See generally Mary Anne Franks, How Stand Your Ground Laws Hijacked Self-
Defense, in GUNS AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
FIREARMS AND FIREARM POLICY (2015); Heather Digby Parton, Black Bodies Are Not
Weapons: Why White Supremacists Insist Michael Brown Was Armed', SALON (Nov. 26,
2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/26/blackbodiesarenotweapons why white
supremacists insist michael brown was armed/ [https://perma.cc/6MKIM-5NDP].
92. Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 181, 215 (1991).
93. Id. at 219.
94. Id.
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homeless people are surveilled, harassed, and arrested for engaging in
activities that would be perfectly legal inside a home: standing or sit-
ting in one place for long periods of time, sleeping, drinking alcohol,
and engaging in sexual activity.95 Violent physical attacks on home-
less individuals are frequent, as are assumptions about drug use, sexu-
al predation, and laziness. 96  Homeless individuals have few
opportunities to shield themselves from view of either law enforce-
ment or an unsympathetic public. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
makes clear that the home is the most protected site of privacy97
those without homes, of course, have no means of accessing these
protections.
Professor Christopher Slobogin has observed that the law govern-
ing constitutional seizures, which allows for arrests to be made in
public without a warrant, results in very different protections for those
with homes and those without:
the police virtually never need a warrant to arrest ei-
ther a homeless person or a person who spends most
of his time outdoors because his home is crowded, in
a state of disrepair, or simply unpleasant. In contrast,
the person with a good home is generally protected
from warrantless arrest in non-exigent circumstanc-
98
es.
Echoing Robin and Robert Collin, Slobogin has also pointed out that
the Supreme Court's assessment of the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" largely turns on the resources one can deploy to protect pri-
vacy:
Instead of declaring that one's living space and be-
longings are automatically entitled to constitutional
protection - a conclusion that would seem to follow
95. See NAT'L L. CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, No Safe Place: The Crimi-
nalization ofHomelessness in U.S. Cities, http://www.nlchp.org/documents/NoSafe Place
[https://perma.cc/9W5Q-ZHMP]. See also Paul Boden and Jeffery Selbin, California is Rife
with Laws Used to Harass Homeless People, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0216-boden-califomia-vagrancy-laws-target-
homeless-20150216-story.html [https://perma.cc/4LCH-7SSP].
96. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, Beyond Stigma and Stereotypes: What is Home-
lessness? (2015), http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/education-outreach/beyond-stigma-and-
stereotypes-what-is-homelessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NZ7-95AV].
97. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) ("It is axiomatic that the
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed."') (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972)). See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that the
home is "the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy").
98. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 404-05 (2003). See also Collin & Collin, supra note 92.
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from the Fourth Amendment's explicit mention of
"houses" and "effects" - the Court has signaled that
the reasonableness of privacy expectations in such
areas is contingent upon the existence of "effective"
barriers to intrusion. In other words, one's constitu-
tional privacy is limited by one's actual privacy.
That stance ineluctably leads to the conclusion that
Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on
the extent to which one can afford accouterments of
wealth such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns,
heavy curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors
and walls. 99
This "poverty exception" to the Fourth Amendment has received little
attention in the popular privacy narrative, which tends to focus on law
enforcement intrusion into cell phones, social media, and search en-
gine histories.
For those who are impoverished but not homeless, the violations
of privacy are still extensive. Obtaining welfare benefits or other so-
cial services often requires enduring intrusive questioning about one's
family life, intimate associations, attempts at gainful employment, and
drug and alcohol use, as well as home inspections. 00 Several states,
such as Florida, have tried to require drug testing for welfare recipi-
ents as a prerequisite for obtaining benefits. 101
In short, the bodies, habits, and decisions of poor people are
closely monitored by both the state and general public. Fourth
Amendment law, tasked with safeguarding the privacy interest of citi-
zens against the government, effectively sets out different constitu-
tional standards for the haves and the have-nots, and the
criminalization of poverty and homelessness ensures that those with
fewer resources are forced to accept daily surveillance of their daily
activities and choices.
3. Female Bodies
In American culture, as in many cultures, women's bodies have
long been treated as property. The doctrine of coverture, which held
sway until the mid-1800s, held that women were "covered" by their
99. Slobogin, supra note 98, at 400-01.
100. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1263-64 (2008); Gilman, Welfare, supra note 19, at 2.
101. See Gilman, Welfare, supra note 19, at 11-12; Lizette Alvarez, Court Strikes Down
Drug Tests for Welfare Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
20 14/12/04/us/politics/court-strikes-down-drug-tests-for-florida-welfare-applicants.html
[https://perma.cc/SJ9X-DQDY].
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husbands upon marriage, losing whatever limited independent status
they may have enjoyed prior to marriage.102 As William Blackstone
relates in his Commentaries, men had the legal right to discipline their
wives through physical assaults. 103 The writings of Lord Hale make it
clear that married women had no right to refuse sexual activity after
marriage because marriage signified their irrevocable consent to their
husband's sexual desires. 104 In other words, women were expected to
accept beatings and rape as part of normal married existence. In addi-
tion to the obvious harms imposed by such expectations, this state of
affairs also deprived women of physical privacy and disciplined them
to conform their lives to men's desires.1 05
Coverture as such does not exist today in the U.S., but its legacy
lives on. Domestic violence was not seriously recognized as a crime
until the 1970s. 106 The typical response even today to the plight of
battered women continues to be "why doesn't she leave?" - a ques-
tion that not only erases male responsibility and ignores basic abuser
dynamics, but also presumes that women facing unlawful violence
should leave their homes. This flies directly in the face of the much-
lauded protections of one's "castle." 0 7 One should not have to retreat
from one's own home, as the home is supposed to be one's place of
retreat. The casual expectation that women should give up the privacy
protections of their own homes when faced with illegitimate aggres-
sion speaks volumes about social and legal views of women's privacy
rights. To leave one's home is to forego solitude and privacy; wherev-
er an abuse victim is forced to flee - whether to the home of a family
member, to a shelter, or to the streets - she will face serious depriva-
tions of her freedom of movement and her decisional and bodily pri-
vacy. Reporting abuse to the police subjects a victim to invasive,
102. See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization ofMarital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives'
Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994).
103. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *421
(1765). See also Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating As Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2121-2122 (1996).
104. See SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1847);
Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences:
A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.. 1465, 1477-85 (2003).
105. See Kimberly D. Bailey, It's Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1777 (2012).
106. See Domestic Violence Law, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://criminal-
justice.iresearchnet.com/crime/domestic-violence/domestic-violence-law/ [https://perma.cc/
39K3-WLRF] ("Domestic violence, specifically violence against women, was not recog-
nized as a social problem until the mid-1970s.").
107. See Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your
Ground, Battered Women 's Syndrome, and Violence As Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1099, 1106-07 (2014) ("In traditional self-defense law, the 'castle doctrine' stipulates
that one is not required to retreat from one's own home, even if it is possible to do so in
complete safety.").
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humiliating questioning and in many cases triggers an investigative
process that puts her under quite literal surveillance. 08
It is worth noting that popular conceptions of privacy have also
historically been used as a shield for domestic violence.109 For more
than a century, the state invoked the concept of family privacy as a
reason not to acknowledge or interfere with domestic relations.110
While this misuse of privacy has lost some of its force in recent dec-
ades, respect for privacy is still often invoked to protect men's actions
in intimate relationships." This underscores the need to ensure that
our conception of privacy is focused on the needs and interests of the
most vulnerable.
Sexual assault, whether within marriage or not, is one of the most
privacy-destroying forms of abuse. Victims are denied the most basic
rights to refuse the intimate exposure and use of their bodies. The
psychological after-effects of sexual assault can be lifelong and crip-
pling, hindering victims' ability to feel in control of their bodies and
of their most intimate decisions. Sexual harassment in the street, on
public transportation, at work, and at school, remind women that their
bodies are not truly their own.112
Technology has greatly exacerbated the surveillance and disci-
pline of women's bodies, as women must now also navigate hidden
cameras, the possibility of recorded sexual assaults, threats of "re-
venge porn," and the proliferation of online mobs engaging in vicious
campaigns of sustained sexualized abuse.11 3 Advances in surveillance
technology have made stalking easier, cheaper, and more insidious.
108. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis & Carol E. Jordan, Encouraging Victims: Responding to
a Recent Study ofBattered Women Who Commit Crimes, 15 Nev. L.J. 1, 13-14 (2014).
109. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193
(1989), ("[T]he legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital
rape, and women's exploited domestic labor. It has preserved the central institutions where-
by women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control, and self-definition."); see generally
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence ofPrivacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991).
110. See Rebecca Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 237, 238 (2010); Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 557, 557 (2006); Domestic Violence and Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/dv/ [https://perma.cc/FRH2-VXS6] ("Vic-
tims of domestic violence often need to protect their personal contact data from their abus-
ers. However, the personal data industry in the United States makes this difficult."). But see
Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 488 (2009).
111. See Margaret Talbot, Matters of Privacy, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/matters-privacy [https://perma.cc/P6SV-
PENQ].
112. See Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 542 (1993) ("[T]he continuation and near-general toler-
ance of street harassment has serious consequences both for women and for society at large.
It inflicts the most direct costs upon women, in the form of fear, emotional distress, feelings
of disempowerment, and significant limitations upon their liberty, mobility, and hopes for
equality.").
113. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FORESTL. REV. 345, 347 (2014).
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Spyware, GPS monitoring, and webcam hijacking can turn a stalked
woman's life into an unending nightmare." 4 Stalkers and abusive
partners can now monitor virtually every move their targets make,
whether that is searching the Internet for domestic violence support
resources, dialing a family member's number from a cellphone, or
driving their car to a friend's house." 5
The denial of reproductive rights is yet another incursion into the
privacy rights of women." 6 Interfering with a woman's most intimate
decisions regarding her own body, including how to manage the risk
of pregnancy, whether to bring a pregnancy to term, or how to control
the timing and spacing of pregnancies, violates basic privacy rights.
Requiring women to undergo unnecessary procedures such as trans-
vaginal ultrasounds before allowing them to obtain abortions forces
women to "consent" to physical invasions of their bodies - a form of
legalized and medicalized sexual assault." 7 Requirements for abor-
tions such as parental or spousal consent or notification also limit
women and girls' access to reproductive health care and facilitate sur-
veillance." 8 The increasing criminalization of pregnancy, including
arrests of women who attempt suicide or use illegal drugs while preg-
nant, entails invasive scrutiny of women's most private struggles." 9
Women can expect that nearly every detail of their intimate lives
will be subject to multiple forms of surveillance by state as well as
private actors, from domestic violence to sexual objectification to the
denial of reproductive control. These forms of surveillance have seri-
ous, well-documented effects, ranging from loss of employment and
educational opportunities, restrictions on the freedom to move, asso-
114. See Cindy Southworth & Sarah Tucker, Technology, Stalking, and Domestic Vio-
lence Victims, 76 MISS. L.J. 667, 667 (2007).
115. See Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Vic-
tims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/09/
15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims
[https://perma.cc/V36Z-AS7S].
116. See Linda McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 125
(1992).
117. See Kelsey Anne Green, Humiliation, Degradation, Penetration: What Legislatively
Required Pre-Abortion Transvaginal Ultrasounds and Rape Have in Common, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1172-73 (2013); Note, Physically Intrusive Abortion Restrictions
As Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures, 128 HARV. L. REv. 951, 958-67 (2015).
118. See generally Helaine F. Lobman, Spousal Notification: An Unconstitutional Limi-
tation on a Woman's Right to Privacy in the Abortion Decision, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 531
(1984).
119. See Fergusonv. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001). See generally ROBERTS,
supra note 80; Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657
(2008); Emily Bazelon, Purvi Patel Could Be Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr.
1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/magazine/purvi-patel-could-be-just-the-
beginning.html [https://perma.cc/A36M-DU4H].
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ciate, or dress as one wishes, interference with parenting abilities, and
loss of general confidence.120
4. Bodies At the Intersection
The forces that marginalize individuals, whether race, poverty, or
gender, do not exist in isolation from each other. Civil rights advocate
and legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term "intersectionali-
ty" to describe the "multidimensionality" of lived experience, in par-
ticular how certain individuals may face discrimination from multiple
sources and on multiple levels.121 She writes,
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection,
coming and going in all four directions. Discrimina-
tion, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in
one direction, and it may flow in another. If an acci-
dent happens at an intersection, it can be caused by
cars traveling from any number of directions, and,
sometimes, from all of them. 122
Using black women as her primary example, Crenshaw writes, "[I]f a
Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury
could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination."1 23
Though this Article focuses on the discussion of unequal surveillance
based on race, class, and gender, an individual's experience may also
be marked by any combination of class, disability, sexual orientation,
gender identity, age, or other features.
In 2015, applying an intersectional analysis to the phenomenon of
police brutality, Crenshaw explained that "[a]lthough Black women
are routinely killed, raped, and beaten by the police, their experiences
are rarely foregrounded in popular understandings of police brutali-
ty .... [I]nclusion of Black women's experiences in social move-
ments, media narratives, and policy demands around policing and
police brutality is critical to effectively combating racialized state vio-
lence for Black communities and other communities of color."1 24 Pro-
120. See Tara Culp-Ressler, This is What Women Are Forced to Do to Avoid Street Har-
assment, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 16, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2015/04/16/
3647702/street-harassment-women-impact/ [https://perma.cc/6A3V-M9AR] (comparing the
ways in which society expects women to alter their routines to avoid street harassment to the
ways it tells women to change their behavior to avoid rape).
121. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989).
122. Id. at 149.
123. Id.
124. #SayHerName: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women, AFR. AM. POL'Y F.
(July 2015), http://www.aapf.org/sayhemamereport/ [https://perma.cc/YL4Z-XETT].
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fessor Michele Gilman highlights how class and gender work together
to intensify surveillance inequality, observing that "poor women have
always had less privacy than other women,"125 and detailing how poor
women's economic needs translate into multiple forms of invasive
surveillance along both class and gender axes: "As a condition of re-
ceiving welfare benefits, poor women have been subjected to drug
tests, and they continue to face unannounced home inspections by
government officials, fingerprinting, and restrictions on their repro-
ductive choices." 26
Attention to intersectionality is important for both ethical and
pragmatic reasons. Understanding intersectionality is necessary to
focus our attention on the most vulnerable members of society. We
also cannot fully understand social problems without acknowledging
how they are distributed unevenly across society and how they inter-
act with each other.127 The harms of surveillance are complex and
compounding, and effective resistance requires confronting that fact.
An intersectional approach to privacy recognizes that marginalized
individuals are what the critical race scholar Mari Matsuda calls "epis-
temological sources."128 Those with the longest and deepest experi-
ences with subordination and oppression are the ones best equipped to
develop strategies to conquer them.
B. Is Everything Data? Is Data Everything?
There is general agreement across the political spectrum that sur-
veillance is harmful at least in part because it constrains individual
autonomy and expression, which in turn jeopardizes the possibility of
a truly democratic society. The disciplinary and inhibiting effects of
surveillance can be very serious.129 Beyond the impassioned rhetoric
about chilling effects, however, specific articulation of the harm of
mass surveillance can be difficult to find in privacy scholarship. For
example, Bernard Harcourt's 2015 book Exposed: Desire and Diso-
bedience in the Digital Age is full of dark proclamations about how
125. Gilman, Welfare, supra note 19, at 2.
126. Id.
127. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV.
L. REv. 2010, 2010 (2013).
128. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 325 (1987).
129. See Margot Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 465-67
(2015). Some scholars have argued that the empirical evidence offered in support of the
harm of surveillance alone is thin. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How
Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REv. 1069, 1094-101
(2014) (noting scant empirical evidence of what he calls the "stultification thesis"). See also
Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633,
1657-58 (2013).
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we are all becoming "marketized subjects - or rather subject-objects
who are nothing more than watched, tracked, followed, profiled at
will, and who in turn do nothing more than watch and observe oth-
ers."130 While Harcourt raises compelling questions about the meta-
physical consequences of a surveillance society, he never quite
articulates what the actual harm of surveillance is. The closest the
reader gets to a sense of the harm is in a personal anecdote Harcourt
relates about being photographed by a security guard before a speak-
ing engagement:
I could not resist. I did not resist. I could not chal-
lenge the security protocol. I was embarrassed to
challenge it, so I gave in without any resistance. But
it still bothers me today. Why? Because I had no
control over the dissemination of my own identity, of
my face. Because I felt like I had no power to chal-
lenge, to assert myself.131
Clearly, Harcourt is troubled by the experience, but it is difficult
to discern exactly why. There is no indication that the security guard
is sadistic or voyeuristic, no suggestion that the photograph was ever
used for anything other than its ostensible and fairly innocuous pur-
pose. What is most striking is that being photographed as a routine
security measure in a luxury Manhattan skyscraper appears to be the
closest Harcourt has come to feeling under surveillance.132 The pre-
sumption of harm, rather than the precise articulation of harm, is a
common characteristic of the contemporary surveillance narrative.133
When concrete examples of chilling effects of surveillance are de-
scribed, they tend to be decidedly middle-class in nature: changes in
one's online shopping, banking, and search engine habits due to con-
cerns of being tracked.134
130. BERNARD HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
26 (2015).
13 1. Id. at 222.
132. Id. at 221-22. For a more extensive critique of Professor Harcourt's book, see Mary
Anne Franks, Unequal Exposure, CONCURRING OPINIONS (March 18, 2016),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2016/03/unequal-exposure.html
[https://perma.cc/P69K-P4U3] (contribution to online symposium).
133. See DANIEL CASTRO & ALAN MCQUINN, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE
PRIVACY PANIC CYCLE: A GUIDE TO PUBLIC FEARS ABOUT NEW TECHNOLOGIES 1-4
(2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015-privacy-panic.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHY4-S2YA]; Omri
Ben-Shahar, Privacy Paranoia: Is Your Phone Spying on You?, FORBES (July 5, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2016/07/05/privacy-paranoia-is-your-
smartphone-spying-on-you/#2c63be345210 [https://perma.cc/8N6K-XR8K] (characterizing
privacy fears of smart devices as "alarmist").
134. See supra Section II.A.
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As Michele Gilman writes, low-income Americans do not strike
the same "surveillance bargains" as middle- and high-income Ameri-
cans: "Low-income Americans travel more often by bus than plane,
they lack money to shop at Amazon.com, and they are less likely to
have a computer that makes social networking possible in the first
place."135 That is, the kind of digital trail mostly left by middle- and
upper-class Americans, and the primarily informational privacy inter-
ests at stake - financial data, shopping habits, search engine queries,
and the like - are marked by class considerations.136 Poor people,
having far fewer possibilities of consumption, produce much less data
of this kind compared to wealthy people.137 Marginalized individuals,
such as the imprisoned, the homeless, and the disabled, leave consid-
erably fainter digital trails than the middle or upper class.138 The focus
on informational privacy also obscures other, arguably more signifi-
cant, privacy interests. These factors are particularly significant when
it comes to understanding the destructive effects of invasions of pri-
vacy and crafting solutions to the problem.
In Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and
the Fourth Amendment, Professor David Sklansky argues that privacy,
at least in terms of Fourth Amendment law, is "overloaded with in-
formation"; 139 that is, "a preoccupation with data flows has led to the
neglect of important dimensions of privacy." 14 o While Sklansky
acknowledges that some privacy scholars are "careful to avoid claim-
ing that privacy can be reduced to information privacy,"14 he notes
that the information-based approach to privacy "now dominates the
way most judges and scholars think about the Fourth Amendment,""42
and the Fourth Amendment tends to dominate the way many people
think about privacy.143 Sklansky calls for a richer conception of priva-
cy, one that focuses not just on information streams but also on em-
bodied reality. Sklansky calls his alternative vision of privacy
"privacy as refuge," focusing on searches of homes, strip searches,
investigatory stops and frisks, and informants. 144
Sklansky's analysis illuminates many of the shortcomings of an
approach to privacy that focuses too heavily on information streams.
Such a focus pushes arguably higher-stakes privacy invasions to the
135. Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 19, at 1389-90.
136. See Sklansky, supra note 129, at 1086.
137. For a nuanced discussion of the digital divide, see EUBANKS, supra note 19, at 8.
138. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, DIGITAL DIFFERENCES 2 (2012), http://pewintemet.org/Reports/2012/Digital-
differences.aspx [https://perma.cc/MK6Q-8L5G].
139. Sklansky, supra note 129, at 1069.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1102.
142. Id. at 1103.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 1113-21.
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margins and privileges data over bodies. While Sklansky may over-
state the distinction between informational privacy and bodily privacy
(discussed below), his assessment of the limitations of a data-driven
approach to privacy and surveillance is incisive. The harms caused by
data privacy violations are certainly not trivial, especially in the age of
data aggregation, when seemingly innocuous pieces of information
can be combined with hundreds of other seemingly innocuous pieces
of information to compose a comprehensive profile of an individu-
al.14 5 The point is not that such harms are not serious, but rather that
they should encourage us to take even more seriously other, more
substantial harms that bear a much more direct relationship with an
individual's freedom. As Gilman points out, the digital divide "does
not mean . . . that the poor are insulated from privacy intrusions." 4 6
On the contrary, they endure a barrage of information-collection prac-
tices that are far more invasive and degrading than those experienced
by their wealthier neighbors. 4 7 If being forced to alter one's online
search habits is considered a chilling effect that undermines democra-
cy, being forced to alter one's clothing, job, school, choice of friends,
communication with family, romantic relationships, or freedom of
movement should surely be viewed even more seriously. For the less
privileged members of society, surveillance does not simply mean
inhibited Internet searches or decreased willingness to make online
purchases; it can mean an entire existence under scrutiny, with every
personal choice carrying a risk of bodily harm.
C. Determining the Real Threat: The State/Private Dichotomy
The contemporary privacy narrative tends to assume that the
threat of surveillance emanates from the state. Numerous recent stud-
ies, surveys, and articles on privacy focus exclusively on violations by
the government. 4 8 In the first instance, this position presumes that
145. See David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom ofIn-
formation Act, 115 Yale L.J. 628, 630 (2005).
146. Gilman, The Class Differential, supra note 19, 13 89-90.
147. See id. at 1390-91.
148. See, e.g., Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government Surveil-
lance, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 771, 771 (2016); Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveil-
lance?, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23, 23 (2016); Orin S. Kerr, A Rule ofLenity for National Securi-
Security Surveillance Law, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1513 (2014); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher
Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay
Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Sur-
veillance Authorities, 16 Yale J.L. & Tech. 134 (2013); John Yoo, The Legality of the Na-
tional Security Agency's Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 901
(2014); GALLUP, Americans Disapprove of Government Surveillance Programs (June 12,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163043/americans-disapprove-govemment-surveillance-
programs.aspx [https://pena.cc/PUY5-X5ZW]; GLOBAL STRATEGY GROUP, PRIVACY
RESEARCH SURVEY (May 18, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field
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government and private entities can be meaningfully distinguished
from one another. On some level this is true, in that the government
formally makes decisions about who and what to surveil, but the sur-
veillance powers of the state are exercised by and through private
technology, particularly Internet technology. The government was
instrumental in the development of the Internet itself and was deeply
involved in the creation of Google, the dominant search engine in the
United States.1 49
Cell phone carriers, social media applications, and search engines
now possess huge troves of user information. The information that the
government uses to spy on its citizens is more often than not handed
to them by private actors, sometimes for profit,15 0 and many of these
private technology actors are more than willing to hand over their us-
ers' intimate data to the government.' 5 ' It should be widely known by
now that technology giants such as Google and Facebook are not in
fact free services, but rather platforms that essentially trade in users'
private information. These companies' knowledge of the average citi-
zen's browsing habits, intimate relationships, political views, and
health status almost certainly outstrips that of any government entity.
Many U.S. citizens seem unconcerned (or least comparatively less
concerned) about the vast amounts of information they voluntarily
hand over to these corporations, even though it has been repeatedly
pointed out that these companies often work hand in hand with the
government.152 In any event, these companies' bottom lines are hardly
in alignment with privacy-minded individuals.
Conventional wisdom would also indicate that we should worry
most about the state's ability to intrude into our lives because of its
power to incarcerate. But very few U.S. citizens have in fact found
themselves facing incarceration or even investigation merely for their
online searches or their metadata. Again, this does not mean that fear
of such consequences are unfounded or trivial, but it does present a
stark contrast to the actual deprivations of physical liberty experi-
enced by, for example, black men, poor people, and women at the
hands of both government and private actors.
The government's ever-increasing ability to exploit and aggregate
data networks to spy on its citizens certainly does present new, power-
ful, and terrifying challenges to individual privacy, but the fixation on
document/privacyjoll results.pdf [https://pena.cc/HP39-3BVV]; PEN AMVERICAN
CENTER, supra note 44.
149. See infra Section III.C.1.
150. See, e.g., Heidi Boghosian, The Business ofSurveillance, 39 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. 2, 3
(2013) (noting that "[i]n exchange for government contracts and funding, corporations
amass and store a wealth of personal information on individuals easily retrievable by law
enforcement agencies.").
151. See infra Section III.C.1.
152. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 130, at 14.
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state as opposed to private surveillance demonstrates blindness to the
harms of private surveillance, which for many people can have more
far-reaching and serious consequences than official state surveillance.
1. There Is Nothing Outside the State
The groundwork for the Internet was laid in the 1960s, when the
U.S. government created an organization called the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency ("ARPA") to develop a communications sys-
tem that could withstand enemy attacks.153 In the 1970s, the agency
was taken over by the Department of Defense and renamed DARPA,
or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.154 In the 1980s, the
National Science Foundation ("NSF"), a U.S. government agency; the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"); and the
U.S. Department of Energy provided backbone communication sys-
tem facilities for the Internet. 15 While the Internet now functions as a
result of collaboration among government agencies of many countries,
private technology companies, and the academic community, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the Internet was initially founded and de-
veloped by the U.S. government for military purposes.
According to a lengthy and detailed expos6 by investigative jour-
nalist Dr. Nafeez Ahmed, the U.S. government- in particular its
intelligence agencies - also played a key role in the development of
what would become the country's most popular search engine,
Google. 15 As Ahmed writes, "the United States intelligence commu-
nity funded, nurtured and incubated Google as part of a drive to dom-
inate the world through control of information. Seed-funded by the
NSA and CIA, Google was merely the first among a plethora of pri-
vate sector start-ups co-opted by US intelligence to retain 'infor-
mation superiority.'" 57 Ahmed describes how, for the last two
decades, a secret group sponsored by the Pentagon "has functioned as
a bridge between the US government and elites across the business,
industry, finance, corporate, and media sectors." 5 8 This group, known
as the Highlands Forum, "has allowed some of the most powerful
153. See MITCH WALDROP, DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY, DARPA AND
THE INTERNET REVOLUTION (2008), http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/
(2015)%20 Global/o2ONav%20-%2OAbout%2OUs%20 -%20History%20-/o20Resources
0o20-%/2050tlh% 20-%/ 20Intemet%/o20(Approved).pdf [https://perma.cc/B8X6-ARNS].
154. See id.
155. See A Brief History ofNSF and the Internet, NAT'L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003),
https://www.nsf.gov/news/newssummjsp?cntn id=103050 [https://perma.cc/57QVVJDR].
156. See Nafeez Ahmed, How the CIA Made Google: Inside the Secret Network Behind
Mass Surveillance, Endless War, and Skynet - Part 1, MEDIUM (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://medium.com/@NafeezAhmed/how-the-cia-made-google-e836451a959e
[https://perma.cc/M53S-RBWV].
157. Id.
158. Id.
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special interests in corporate America to systematically circumvent
democratic accountability and the rule of law to influence government
policies, as well as public opinion in the US and around the world."159
The forum helped produce our current state of mass surveillance,
which Ahmed claims serves sinister "operational purpose[s]," includ-
ing:
[A]ssisting with the lethal execution of special op-
erations, selecting targets for the CIA's drone strike
kill lists via dubious algorithms, for instance, along
with providing geospatial and other information for
combatant commanders on land, air and sea, among
many other functions. A single social media post on
Twitter or Facebook is enough to trigger being
placed on secret terrorism watch-lists solely due to a
vaguely defined hunch or suspicion; and can poten-
tially even land a suspect on a kill list.16 0
Private companies regularly turn over user data in response to
government requests.16 ' Google provides information about how
many of these requests it receives per year and how often it complies
with the requests in its Transparency Report.162 In the first half of
2014, Google received nearly 32,000 data requests from governments,
providing information for 65% of the requests.163 According to one
estimate, AT&T and Verizon combined received one request from
U.S. authorities every minute in 2013.164 National Security Agency
documents disclosed in August 2015 revealed that AT&T had assisted
the agency on a much larger scale than previously thought. 16 Accord-
ing to the New York Times:
159. Id.
160. Nafeez Ahmed, How the CIA Made Google: Inside the Secret Network Behind Mass
Surveillance, Endless War, and Skynet - Part 2, MEDIUM (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/why-google-made-the-nsa-
2a80584c9cl#.t2y8gqgg7 [https://perma.cc/P37B-WWC7].
161. See Spencer Ackerman & Dominic Rushe, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Yahoo
Release US Surveillance Requests, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014, 4:40 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/microsoft-facebook-google-yahoo-fisa-
surveillance-requests [https://perma.cc/H8YU-M237].
162. See GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/ [https://perma.cc/NC8F-L4WA].
163. See id.
164. See Brian Fung, AT&T and Verizon Got Government Data Requests Once Every 60
Seconds Last Year. And That's Probably Lowballing It., WASHINGTON POST: THE SWITCH
(May 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/05/att-and-
verizon-got-govemment-data-requests-once-every-60-seconds-last-year-and-thats-probably-
lowballing-it/ [https://perma.cc/GQ6G-E9VZ].
165. See Julia Angwin et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsa-spy-
on-an-array-of-intemet-traffic.html?_r-O [https://perma.cc/TU7N-WSJF].
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The N.S.A.'s top-secret budget in 2013 for the
AT&T partnership was more than twice that of the
next-largest such program . . .. The company in-
stalled surveillance equipment in at least 17 of its In-
ternet hubs on American soil, far more than its
similarly sized competitor, Verizon. And its engi-
neers were the first to try out new surveillance tech-
nologies invented by the eavesdropping agency.166
The true scale of government inquiries regarding user data is un-
known, as many telecommunications companies do not disclose how
many requests they receive, and neither National Security Letter
("NSL") or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") requests
are disclosed. 6 7
Sometimes the government takes an even more direct approach:
as reported by the German newspaper Der Spiegel, experts in the
NSA's Office of Tailored Access Operations hack PCs, routers, and
servers for surveillance purposes, including physically intercepting
hardware, installing backdoors, and then sending it along to the recip-
ients. 1 While some private companies turn over user data reluctantly,
other companies are quick to turn a profit. In December 2013, Senator
Ed Markey released documents that revealed "[m]ajor U.S. cellphone
providers received more than $20 million from law enforcement
agencies in conjunction with more than 1.1. [sic] million user infor-
mation requests in 2012 .... 169
One response to the ever-increasing invasiveness of governmental
surveillance and the collusion between private and government enti-
ties has been the rise in popularity of privacy tools such as the Tor
166. Id.
167. See Lee Munson, New Google Transparency Report Details Hike in Government
User Data Requests, SOPHOS: NAKED SECURITY (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/09/17/new-google-transparency-report-details-hike-
in-government-user-data-requests/ [https://perma.cc/3F89-ST2S].
168. Jacob Appelbaum et al., Inside TAO (Part 3: The NSA 's Shadow Network), DER
SPIEGEL: SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-
nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969-3.html
[https://perma.cc/7984-9PG6] ("If a target ... orders a new computer ... TAO can divert
the shipping delivery to its own secret workshops.... At these so-called 'load stations'
agents carefully open the package in order to load malware onto the electronics .. . that can
provide backdoor access for the intelligence agencies."); see also Darlene Storm, 17 Ex-
ploits the NSA Uses to Hack PCs, Routers and Servers for Surveillance, COMPUTER
WORLD: SECURITY IS SEXY (Jan. 3, 2014, 1:47 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2474275/cybercrime-hacking/17-exploits-the-nsa-
uses-to-hack-pcs--routers-and-servers-for-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/HB6K-
MXN6].
169. Steven Nelson, Cell Providers Collect Millions From Police for Handing Over User
Information, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 9, 2013, 3:04 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/aricles/2013/12/09/cell-providers-collect-millions-from-
police-for-handing-over-user-information [https://perma.cc/E3NC-7RPC].
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Network, free software that allows users to communicate anonymous-
ly by masking their location and usage from network surveillance and
traffic analysis.1 70 Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF")171
and Edward Snowdenl72 have recommended using Tor to evade gov-
ernment surveillance. Unsurprisingly, then, the revelation in July 2014
that the NSA was targeting Tor users173 was met with outrage from
the privacy community. However, as Yasha Levin in Pando Daily
points out, Tor itself was "developed, built and financed by the US
military-surveillance complex."174 Tor's famed "onion routing" 1 was
not developed to protect privacy; it was developed "to allow intelli-
gence and military personnel to work online undercover without fear
of being unmasked by someone monitoring their Internet activity."17 6
Levine notes a curious lack of acknowledgment by the EFF and others
of the role the U.S. government has played and continues to play in
Tor's development. He states, "[i]t's a nice story, pitting scrappy
techno-anarchists against the all-powerful US Imperial machine. But
the facts about Tor are not as clear cut or simple as these folks make
them out to be .. 177
As Harcourt writes in Exposed, the idea of an enemy surveillance
state is outdated and inaccurate.178 Contemporary surveillance "in-
volves a larger amalgam of corporate, intelligence, and security inter-
ests, . . . a 'surveillance-industrial empire' that includes those very
telecommunication companies, as well as social media, retailers, and
intelligence services . ... 179 Confronting contemporary surveillance
requires acknowledging that state action is inextricably linked to pri-
*180
vate action, and vice versa.
170. About Tor, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
[https://perma.cc/KW5P-QGXS].
171. See Eva Galperin et al., Dear NSA, Privacy is a Fundamental Right, Not Reasonable
Suspicion, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 3, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/
dear-nsa-privacy-fundamental-right-not-reasonable-suspicion [https://perma.cc/GY8B-
B76A].
172. See Max Eddy, Snowden to SXSW: Here's How to Keep the NSA Out of Your Stuff
PCMAG.COM (March 11, 2014), http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/security/321511 -snowden-
to-sxsw-here-s-how-to-keep-the-nsa-out-of-your-stuff [https://perma.cc/K9P8-5FTA].
173. See J. Appelbaum et al., NSA Targets the Privacy-Conscious, DAS ERSTE,
http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_age-1.html [https://perma.cc/K54U-
CV5T].
174. Yasha Levine, Almost Everyone Involved in Developing Tor Was (or Is) Funded by
the US Government, PANDO DAILY (July 16, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-
spooks/ [https://perma.cc/Y8WC-QEV4].
175. See Onion Routing: Executive Summary, ONION-ROUTER.NET, http://www.onion-
router.net/Summary.html [https://perma.cc/WC6Y-U63Y].
176. Levine, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. See HARCOURT, supra note 130, at 27-28.
179. Id. at 27.
180. See David Thaw, Surveillance at the Source, 103 KY. L.J. 405, 405-06 (2014-
2015).
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2. The State Is Not Always the Enemy
The contemporary surveillance narrative - and the contemporary
civil liberties narrative that tends to accompany it - seems to take as
a given that the state is evil and that any expansion of its powers is
presumptively illegitimate. Not only does this perspective rest on a
rigid distinction between state and non-state actors that, as demon-
strated above, is more theoretical than real, it is also a deeply cynical
position that ignores the power (indeed the obligation) of the state to
safeguard shared values such as safety, security, and equality. The
skepticism and cynicism towards the state that characterizes much
civil liberties discourse is often justified, but can also be irrational,
overblown, and self-defeating.
The state, at least in Western democratic societies, is at least theo-
retically accountable to the people. While one can dispute the extent
and effectiveness of that accountability, it is arguably far greater than
that of private entities. If government officials engage in surveillance,
there is a possibility that these officials can be reprimanded or voted
out. When a powerful company, offering products that no one pays for
but everyone wants, engages in surveillance, it is more difficult to
detect and much more difficult to address. Google, for example, has
no particular incentive to care what the public thinks of its policies
except to the extent that it affects the company's profitability. It is not
bound, even theoretically, to the will of the people. Google's motto
might have long been "Don't be evil,"' 8 ' but if Google decides to be
evil, who would be able stop it, and how? For that matter, why should
anyone trust the judgment of a for-profit company with regard to what
constitutes evil?
These questions are equally applicable to other non-state entities,
even seemingly well-meaning ones advancing supposedly democratic
causes. WikiLeaks, for example, has been praised for many years by
civil libertarians and the mainstream media for its disclosure of classi-
fled information to the public.182 In response to concerns about the
181. The company changed its motto to "Do the right thing." in February 2016. See Da-
vid Mayer, Why Google Was Smart to Drop its "Don't Be Evil" Motto, FAST COMPANY
(Feb. 9, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/30563 89/the-future-of-work/why-
google-was-smart-to-drop-its-dont-be-evil-motto [https://perma.cc/5QFB-G39K].
182. See, e.g., Megan Friedman, Julian Assange: Readers' Choice for TIME's Person of
the Year 2010, TIME (Dec. 13, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/12/13/julian-assange-
readers-choice-for-times-person-of-the-year-2010/ [https://perma.cc/47V3-JH9J]; Index on
Censorship, Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Announced,
XINDEx (April 22, 2008), https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/04/winners-of-index-
on-censorship-freedom-of-expression-award-announced/ [https://perma.cc/5DX8-8Z8T]
(announcing that WikiLeaks was awarded The Economist New Media Award in 2008 for
being "an invaluable resource for anonymous whistleblowers and investigative journalists");
Editorial, First, They Came for WikiLeaks. Then..., THE NATION (Dec. 9, 2010),
https://www.thenation.com/article/first-they-came-wikileaks-then/ [https://perma.cc/4CJE-
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power of a private entity to make unilateral decisions about the disclo-
sure of sensitive information, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange as-
sured an audience in 2010 that the organization has "a harm
minimization policy" and would safeguard what he termed "legitimate
secrets."1 83 The Associated Press reported in August 2016 that Wik-
iLeaks's disclosures have not just revealed information about interna-
tional espionage and governmental misconduct; they have "also
included the personal information of hundreds of people - including
sick children, rape victims and mental health patients." Critics say
some of the information literally put people's lives at risk. 185 During
the 2016 presidential election, WikiLeaks exposed information dam-
aging to the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic
presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton, a move that was viewed by
some as an attempt to influence the outcome of the election. 8 6 In Jan-
uary 2017, WikiLeaks was criticized for threatening to expose the
private information of thousands of verified Twitter users.8 7 While
WikiLeaks was lauded for helping to expose state surveillance, it did
so by engaging in its own forms of surveillance, and not just of state
actors. There is little reason to treat an entity such as WikiLeaks as
more trustworthy or less dangerous than the state.
The presumption that the state has evil intentions, moreover, often
forecloses other more trenchant analyses: for example, analyses fo-
cused on equal protection, arbitrariness, or power imbalances. If sur-
veillance is being deployed to further marginalize vulnerable groups,
that is certainly a cause for deep concern. If certain groups are being
targeted for more invasive and inhibiting forms of surveillance than
other groups, that too is a cause for concern. In other words, an analy-
sis of government surveillance should be attentive to the role of social
and cultural power. That is precisely what does not tend to happen in
NEEJ]; Paulina Reso, 5 Pioneering Web Sites That Could Totally Change the News, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 19, 2010, 4:46 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/5-
pioneering-web-sites-totally-change-news-article- 1.182979 [https://perma.cc/JGY9-BFN2];
Julian Assange, SAM ADAMS ASSOCIATES FOR INTEGRITY IN INTELLIGENCE,
http://samadamsaward.ch/julian-assange/ [https://perma.cc/ZWV8-8PNE] (announcing the
2010 Sam Adams Associates for Integrity in Intelligence Award as WikiLeaks and Julian
Assange).
183. See Raphael Satter & Maggie Michael, Private Lives Are Exposed as WikiLeaks
Spills Its Secrets, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/b70da83fd1 1 1496dbdfO 15acbb7987fb/private-lives-are-exposed-wikileaks-spills-its-
secrets [https://perma.cc/2JPE-PLGH].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Kyle Cheney, Assange Denies WikiLeaks Trying to Influence Election
Outcome, POLITICO (Nov. 8, 2016, 11:26 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/
julian-assange-election-day-statement-230931 [https://perma.cc/FT8W-PANG].
187. See Jessica Guynn, WikiLeaks Threatens to Publish Twitter Users' Personal Info,
USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2017, 2:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/01/
06/wikileaks-threatens-publish-twitter-users-personal-info/96254138/
[https://perma.cc/2VYR-UFZY].
460
Democratic Surveillance
the dominant privacy narrative, which flattens out the distinctions be-
tween different kinds of privacy invasions and between different
groups of people with varying histories and relationships to govern-
ment power.
A more nuanced analysis of privacy and power might in fact lead
us to conclude that at least in some contexts, the right answer might
be more, not less, surveillance, at least in a distributional sense. For
instance, if what is broadly referred to as overcriminalization is also a
surveillance and privacy issue, we should also consider that the hyper-
policing of poor minority individuals and their neighborhoods exists
alongside the under-policing of privileged individuals and their
neighborhoods. 88 Studies have shown that while stop and frisk poli-
cies and pretextual traffic stops are disproportionately targeted at mi-
nority individuals, white individuals are statistically considerably
more likely to be carrying contraband.1 89 While law enforcement fo-
cuses on black and Hispanic neighborhoods for drug surveillance, the
majority of drug dealers are white.1 90 Also significant: law enforce-
ment's excessive investigative focus on drugs means that other
crimes, such as sexual assault, are ignored. Sexual assault is one of the
most under-investigated crimes, along with other crimes that dispro-
portionately affect women, for example domestic violence and stalk-
ing.191 As Bill Piper, the director of national affairs for the Drug
Policy Alliance, observes, "Every dollar and police hour spent on
nonviolent drug offenders is money and time not spent on real
crime."192 The over-policing of minority individuals for the perpetra-
188. See generally MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE
ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT (2015).
189. Ferguson Police Department Compared to New York Police Department,
INFOGR.AM, https://infogr.am/ferguson-police-department-compared-to-new-york-police-
department [https://perma.cc/GU2Y-E2SZ]; New York Civil Liberties Union, STOP AND
FRISK: REPORT ON 2011 FINDINGS, http://www.nyclu.org/files/stopandfrisk-factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BY5-J2RK]; Aviva Shen, White People Stopped by New York Police Are
More Likely to Have Guns or Drugs Than Minorities, THINK PROGRESS (May 22, 2013),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/05/22/204645 1/white-people-stopped-by-new-york-
police-are-more-likely-to-have-guns-or-drugs-than-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/2BA4-
J4MD].
190. See Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 257, 261 (2009) ("Although the majority of those who shared, sold,
or transferred serious drugs in Seattle are white .. . almost two-thirds (64.2%) of drug ar-
restees are black.... The researchers could not find a 'racially neutral' explanation for the
police prioritization of the downtown drug markets and crack." (citation omitted)).
191. In cases of violence and abuse of women, the law is often remarkably solicitous to-
wards privacy concerns - of the alleged perpetrators. See, e.g., Talbot, supra note 111.
192. Bill Piper, Thousands ofRapists Are Not Behind Bars Because Cops Focus on Mari-
juana Users, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-piper/rape-kit-backlog b_5504287.html [https://perma.cc/
W8HM-FA4D].
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tion of minor, non-violent crimes is often coupled with the under-
policing of serious crimes against minority victims.' 93
3. The Tyranny of Non-State Actors
In addition to reinforcing a false dichotomy between state and
private entities and promoting an unjustifiably totalizing view of the
ills of state surveillance, the hyper-focus on the state as the enemy in
surveillance discourse also obscures and understates the harms caused
by non-state actors. In his classic libertarian text, On Liberty, John
Stuart Mill takes pains to note that the role played by "public authori-
ties" and "political functionaries" in undermining liberty often pales
in comparison to the role of what he refers to as "society." 94 Mill
cautions against focusing exclusively on the power of state, rather
than private, action to undermine liberty:
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was
at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as
operating through the acts of the public authorities.
But reflecting persons perceived that when society is
itself the tyrant - society collectively, over the sep-
arate individuals who compose it - its means of tyr-
annizing are not restricted to the acts which it may
do by the hands of its political functionaries. 195
Mill observes how, despite the fact that the state has more brute pow-
er, the dictates of non-state actors are often more destructive of liber-
ty:
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and
if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any
mandates at all in things with which it ought not to
meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable
than many kinds of political oppression, since,
though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties,
it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much
more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the
soul itself.1 96
Accordingly, Mill called for safeguards not only against the state's
interference with the development of the human personality, but of
193. See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 9 (2015).
194. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7-30 (2nd ed. 1859).
195. Id. at 13.
196. Id.
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society's, which has its own powerful means of destroying individual-
ity and autonomy:
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the mag-
istrate is not enough: there needs protection also
against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by
other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent
from them; to fetter the development, and, if possi-
ble, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in
harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to
fashion themselves upon the model of its own.197
Mill's call for vigilance against the power of private society to enforce
conformity was echoed a century later by William Ramsey Clark, who
noted that "[w]hen a government degrades its citizens, or permits
them to degrade each other, however beneficent the specific purpose,
it limits opportunities for individual fulfillment and national accom-
plishment," 98 a passage quoted by Justice Douglas in his dissent in
the 1971 case United States v. White.199 But these sentiments have
been largely drowned out by the dire assurances of contemporary civil
libertarians that the state is the real enemy.
Thus, even as police brutality rightly becomes an object of na-
tionwide scrutiny, much less attention is paid to the role that private
racism and violence plays in violating the privacy of minority indi-
viduals and pushing them towards conformity, from being followed
around in stores by suspicious salespeople200 to confrontations with
201
angry or fearful armed white men. In the wake of shootings of un-
armed black men by would-be vigilantes, many in the black commu-
nity expressed their fear that there was nothing a young black man
could wear, do, or say, that would not raise his chances of being as-
197. Id. at 13-14. See also Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrim-
ination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 252 (2011).
198. RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 287 (1970) (emphasis added).
199. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764 (1971).
200. See Angela Fichter, The Emotional Toll of Shopping While Black, THE
ESTABLISHrVIENT (June 10, 2016), https://theestablishment.co/the-emotional-toll-of-
shopping-while-black-bcda5e5la7fd#.ioejh5mx3 [https://perma.cc/VS52-YES7].
201. See Kasai Rex, Fear and the Gun Lobby, GOOD (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://magazine.good.is/articles/nra-racism-fear-gun-control [https://perma.cc/SB52-8RVZ]
("Yes, our police on overdrive are symptomatic of a violent, gun-obsessed culture. Yet,
as a black male, I have as much reason to fret over being shot dead just for walking on
someone's porch to ask for help ... as I do getting the wrong cop on a routine traffic
stop.").
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202
saulted or killed by a violent white citizen. Similarly, little attention
is paid to the inhibiting effects of harassment of women, both
203 204
online and offline, despite evidence that such harassment forces
women to change everything from their paths to work to their clothing
choices to their intimate relationship choices, to say nothing of the
fact that many women and girls simply withdraw from political partic-
ipation, from jobs, and from social media in response to surveillance
by private individuals ranging from violent intimate partners to online
mobs.205
IV. INTERSECTIONAL SURVEILLANCE
Attentiveness to race, class, and gender is vital to understanding
the true scope of the surveillance threat. Marginalized populations,
especially those who experience the intersection of multiple forms of
subordination, also often find themselves at the intersection of multi-
ple forms of surveillance: high-tech and low-tech, virtual and physi-
cal. That is, to return to Crenshaw's analogy of a woman being hit by
206
several vehicles at an intersection, the vehicles can represent not
only various categories of identity but various categories of surveil-
lance. The contemporary populist privacy narrative, in general, tends
to overlook both Crenshaw's intersectionality of identities and the
intersectionality of varying forms of surveillance. The following case
studies are examples of surveillance intersectionality that have affect-
ed marginalized individuals.
A. Case Study on the Surveillance ofBlack Bodies: Florence v.
Burlington
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided an important Fourth
Amendment case, United States v. Jones, holding that the govern-
202. See Christian Nwachukwu Jr. & Dana Forde, Not a Threat, but Threatened, AL
JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/features/2014/2/young-black-
men-intheageoftrayvonandjordan.html [https://perma.cc/C7YY-2QST].
203. See Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can't) Do About Online Har-
assment, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2014/1 1/what-the-law-can-and-cant-do-about-online-harassment/3 82638/
[https://perma.cc/B2ZQ-UEQM].
204. See The Advocates for Human Rights, Prevalence of Street Harassment and Its
Consequences, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.stopvaw.org/
prevalencestreetharassment [https://perma.cc/6EHA-V6WS]; Statistics- The Prevalence
of Street Harassment, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/
resources/statistics/statistics-academic-studies/ [https://perma.cc/8H7D-NUL6].
205. See, e.g., Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren't Welcome on the Internet, PAC.
STANDARD (Jan. 6. 2014), http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/women-arent-
welcome-intemet-72170 [https://perma.cc/3EWE-K734].
206. See Crenshaw, supra note 121, at 149.
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ment's attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle for purposes of track-
207
ing its driver was an unconstitutional search. This case received a
great amount of attention not only from scholars but also from the
media and the general public. Another important Fourth Amendment
case decided that year, Florence v. Burlington,208 received far less
attention.209 This latter case found that suspicion-less strip searches of
individuals placed into the general prison population did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.210 The differing outcomes as well as the dif-
fering public interest in these two cases are telling. The first involved
the use of technology to monitor a vehicle; the second involved the
physical stripping and inspection of a human body. Both the Court
and the general public seem to consider the former conduct far more
alarming than the latter; this is likely due in part to the fact that while
the former implicates the interests of the middle and upper class, the
latter is most likely to affect racial minorities and the poor.
It has been suggested that the ruling in Jones turned in no small
part on this exchange between the Chief Justice and Deputy Solicitor
General Michael Dreeben:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would
also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of
our cars, monitored our movements for a month?
You think you're entitled to do that under your theo-
ry?
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.)
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is
yes, you could tomorrow decide that you put a GPS
device on every one of our cars, follow us for a
month; no problem under the Constitution?211
The Justices were confronted in this case by state action that they
could easily contemplate being used to affect their own personal pri-
207. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400 (2012).
208. Florence v. Burlington, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
209. See Sklansky, supra note 129, 1103-05.
210. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 318.
211. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)
(No. 10 1259), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/10-
1259.pdf [https://perma.cc/56CZ-R722].
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vacy. This is not the first time the Court has shown selective empathy
212in Fourth Amendment cases, but it is a particularly poignant exam-
ple when considered in juxtaposition to Florence.
Albert Florence, an African-American man, was wrongfully ar-
213
rested on the basis of an outdated warrant. Before the error was
discovered, he was detained for six days at two correctional facilities,
where he was subjected to an invasive strip search that involved
squatting naked in front of officers and coughing to demonstrate that
214he was not hiding any weapons or contraband inside his orifices.
Seven years before the wrongful arrest, Florence had driven away
from a traffic stop and for this had been charged with obstruction of
215justice and use of a deadly weapon (the vehicle). He was fined
$1500 in exchange for a guilty plea to lesser charges, and at some
216point fell behind in payment. After failing to appear at an enforce-
ment hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.217 Florence
paid the balance less than a week later.218 As a precaution, Florence, a
finance manager for a car dealership, kept a certified document stating
that he had paid the fine in the glove department of his BMW: "Just in
case that situation was to come up, I had that document."219 Two
years later, as he was on the way to dinner with his pregnant wife,
April, and their four-year-old son to celebrate their purchase of a
220home, the Florences' vehicle was pulled over by a state trooper.
April was driving, but when the trooper ran a check on Florence as the
owner of the vehicle, he came across the warrant. Florence produced
the document from the glove compartment, but the trooper said "he
had to go by what was in the computer." 221
Florence was first taken to Burlington County Detention Center,
222
where he was held for six days. Intake procedures at Burlington
included showering with a delousing agent while officers check ar-
212. See Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States
v. Jones Fits into the Court's Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. JL. & TECH. 461, 462-63
(2013).
213. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323.
214. See id. at 323-24.
215. Id. at 323.
216. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Is Asked About Jails'Blanket Strip-Search Poli-
cies, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
is-asked-about-jails-blanket-strip-search-policies/2011/09/09/glQAuc6vNK story.html
[https://perma.cc/7ZET-2J52].
217. Florence, 566 U.S. at 323.
218. Id.
219. Barnes, supra note 216.
220. See id.; Angela J. Davis, Supreme Court's Disconcerting Opinion Supporting Jail-
house Strip-Searches, AM. CONST. SOC'Y: ACSBLOG (Apr. 5, 2012), http:!!
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/florence-v.-burlington [https://perma.cc/BF78-7G5U].
221. Barnes, supra note 216.
222. Florence, 566 U.S. at 323.
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restees' bodies for contraband, tattoos, and scars.223 Florence was also
"instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn
,,224
around, and lift his genitals. Florence was then transferred to the
Essex County Correctional Facility, whose intake procedures for all
arriving detainees include passing through a metal detector and wait-
225ing in a group holding cell for further search. During that further
search, "they were instructed to remove their clothing while an officer
looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband. .. . [A]n officer
looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms,
,,226
armpits, and other body openings. According to Florence, "he was
required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting posi-
,,227tion as part of the process. These procedures were imposed "re-
gardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or
the detainee's behavior, demeanor, or criminal history." 228 Florence
brought a Section 1983 claim229 alleging violations of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. He argued that the invasive strip
search procedures should be required only when there is individual-
230ized suspicion that the arrestee might be concealing contraband.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, disagreed: "[C]ourts
must defer to the judgment of correctional officials" with regard to the
appropriateness of intake procedures "unless the record contains sub-
stantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjusti-
fied response to problems of jail security." 23' In arriving at this
conclusion, Justice Kennedy referred to the fact that ten thousand as-
saults on corrections staff occur each year and noted several incidents
232
of inmates smuggling contraband or weapons. However, as Justice
Breyer noted in dissent, the total number of assaults on corrections
staff hardly sheds light on the question of the necessity or even use-
fulness of invasive strip searches of arrestees, especially when there is
233
no reason to suspect that they are carrying contraband. The total
number of assaults on staff presumably includes assaults by the entire
inmate population, not just arrestees, as well as by other staff mem-
bers. The reference to assaults moreover does not indicate whether
contraband played any role in such assaults. In determining whether
suspicion-less invasive searches of arrestees for contraband are neces-
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 324.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. A Section 1983 claim is a civil claim brought by a citizen against a state actor for
violation of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
230. Florence, 566 U.S. at 324.
23 1. Id. at 322-23.
23 2. Id. at 3 3 3.
233. Id. at 352-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
No. 2] 467
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30
sary or even advisable, the relevant information should instead be the
number of assaults committed by arrestees using contraband and who
did not present any individualized suspicion of possessing contraband.
Justice Breyer cited an Orange County study that found one success-
ful suspicion-less search out of twenty-three thousand searches.234
Albert Florence's case is a study in intersectional surveillance
targeted at a marginalized member of society: as a black man, Flor-
ence was vulnerable to racial profiling by law enforcement. Florence
was so acutely aware of this vulnerability that he made sure to keep a
physical copy of proof that he had paid his previous fines in the vehi-
cle his wife was driving. While the exact circumstances of the traffic
stop are unclear, it is possible that the couple's race was a factor in the
trooper's decision to pull them over in the first place. The erroneous
database record was a form of data surveillance, which was com-
pounded by the trooper's insistence that "he had to go by what was in
the computer." 235
Why did the Supreme Court respond so differently to the attach-
ment of a GPS device to a suspected drug dealer's vehicle, parked in a
public area, as opposed to the forced stripping and intimate bodily
inspection of a man wrongfully arrested due to a computer error? The
answer may have to do with the Court's inability or unwillingness to
acknowledge the intersectionality of Florence's situation. As indicated
by the Chief Justice's pointed questioning in Jones, GPS tracking of
one's vehicle is clearly the kind of violation the Justices could imag-
ine themselves experiencing, whereas they may have had a harder
time contemplating the possibility of being an arrestee subjected to an
invasive strip search before being admitted into the general population
of a jail. As attorney John W. Whitehead observed in the Huffington
Post,
I doubt that Anthony M. Kennedy, John G. Roberts
Jr., Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito Jr. - the five justices who seemed to have no
trouble inflicting such humiliations on the popu-
lace - would be inclined to condone such dehuman-
izing treatment were there even the slightest
possibility that they might be subjected to it. It is a
testament to the elitist mindset that prevails in our
judicial system today that these five men can rest
easy knowing that they will never be subjected to
any such violation of their persons. It is only average
Americans - the so-called "great unwashed mass-
234. Id. at 349.
235. Barnes, supra note 216.
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es" - who will have to worry about being subjected
to this state-sanctioned brand of humiliation and
236bodily violation.
It may be, as Professor Tamara Rice Lave suggests, that the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence "can be best understood as
reaching resolutions that best protect the interests of elites,"237 and
that cases that do not seem to impact those interests simply do not
merit the same kind of consideration.
It is not only the Supreme Court that is more interested in the pri-
vacy implications of GPS tracking than those of invasive strip search-
es. A July 2016 search of Westlaw's "Law Reviews and Journals"
database of the case citation for U.S. v. Jones yields over a thousand
results; a search for the case citation for Florence v. Burlington yields
13 results. A search for "U.S. v. Jones" and "GPS"238 in Westlaw's
"News" database yields 239 results; a search for "Florence v. Burling-
ton" yields 14 results. The legal academy and the general public seem
to share in the Supreme Court's privacy hierarchy.
B. Case Study on the Surveillance ofPoor Bodies: U.S. v. Pineda-
Moreno
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take up a different
GPS tracking case in its 2012 term: one that, on its face, seemed to
present an even more serious violation of the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches than Jones. That case was Unit-
ed States v. Pineda-Moreno, from the Ninth Circuit.239 In 2007, Juan
Pineda-Moreno came under suspicion of engaging in drug activities
by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA").240 As part of their
investigation, the agents installed mobile tracking devices on Pineda-
Moreno's Jeep on several occasions, often while the vehicle was
parked in a public area.241 Twice, however, the agents installed the
device in the early hours of the morning while the Jeep was parked in
242the driveway of Pineda-Moreno's trailer home. These devices gath-
ered detailed information about the vehicle's movements, including
one occasion in which the information indicated that the vehicle was
236. John W. Whitehead, Strip-Searching America: Florence v. County of Burlington,
HUFFINGTON POST (April 4, 2012, 11:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-
whitehead/supreme-court-strip-searches b_1401063.html [https://perma.cc/DMH9-7PV2].
237. See Lave, supra note 212, at 467.
238. To distinguish the 2012 Supreme Court case from other cases involving parties
named Jones.
239. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
240. See id.
241. See id. at 1213.
242. See id.
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243departing a site where the agents believed marijuana was grown.
When agents pulled over Pineda-Moreno's Jeep, they claimed to have
244
smelled marijuana on a passenger in the back seat. The three occu-
pants of the vehicle were arrested for immigration violations.245
Pineda-Moreno consented to the search of his vehicle and his home,
where marijuana was discovered.246 Pineda-Moreno moved to sup-
press the information obtained by the tracking devices as the fruit of
an unconstitutional search - namely, the attachment of the tracking
device to his vehicle while the vehicle was parked within the curtilage
247
of his home. In an illustration of Slobogin's "poverty exception," a
panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit found that Pineda-Moreno had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway because he "did not
take steps to exclude passersby" from it.248 Pineda-Moreno petitioned
249for a rehearing en banc, which was denied.
Judge Kozinski, then Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, wrote a
250blistering dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. Judge
Kozinski opined that the panel's decision effectively "spells the end
of Fourth Amendment protections for most people's curtilage" - and
by most people, he meant those unable to afford the protections of
gated communities and sophisticated security systems.251 Judge
Kozinski condemned what he perceived to be elitism infecting the
court's reasoning, which he attributed to the lack of genuine class di-
versity in the judiciary generally:
Poor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can't
afford all the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring
it.... When you glide your BMW into your under-
ground garage or behind an electric gate, you don't
need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking
device to it while you sleep. But the Constitution
doesn't prefer the rich over the poor; the man who
parks his car next to his trailer is entitled to the same
privacy and peace of mind as the man whose urban
fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol. The panel's
breezy opinion is troubling on a number of grounds,
243. See id. at 1214.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1214-15.
249. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
250. See id. at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 1123.
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not least among them its unselfconscious cultural
elitism. 25 2
With his case on remand in light of Jones, Pineda-Moreno still re-
ceived no relief. The panel found that the officers had acted on "then-
binding circuit precedent."253 The Supreme Court, by taking on Jones
instead of Pineda-Moreno, passed up an opportunity to directly ad-
dress the issues regarding economic privilege raised by Judge
254Kozinski.
Pineda-Moreno's low-income status made him vulnerable to a
wide range of privacy invasions. As Judge Kozinski detailed, people
who live in trailer homes are already at the mercy of nosy neighbors,
curious children, and scavenging animals in ways that people who live
in more glamorous housing are not. The panel used this very vulnera-
bility against Pineda-Moreno, in effect arguing that people who can-
not afford to protect their privacy from the general public cannot
complain when the state violates that privacy as well. Pineda-
Moreno's story is one of a vulnerable member of society targeted by
both low-tech (trespass and in-person tracking) and high-tech (GPS
monitoring) surveillance.
C. Case Study on the Surveillance ofFemale Bodies: United States v.
PetroviC255
Jovica Petrovic and M.B. began a relationship in 2006 and were
256
married in 2009. During their relationship, M.B. allowed Petrovic
257to take sexually explicit photographs of her. M.B. also confided in
Petrovic about the sexual abuse she had experienced as a child, her
struggle with suicidal thoughts, and her fears about her fitness as a
258
mother. M.B. attempted suicide by slitting her wrists in Petrovic's
home after she discovered that he had been having an affair and had
259impregnated his mistress. Petrovic took pictures of the pool of
blood on the floor left by the attempt after M.B. was taken to the hos-
260pital. On several occasions, Petrovic secretly filmed M.B. when
they were having sex.261 After M.B. informed Petrovic that she was
252. See id.
253. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012).
254. Cf Lave, supra note 212, at 463.
255. See United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012).
256. Id. at 852.
257. See id. at 852.
258. Nicholas Phillips, Sext Fiend, RIVERFRONT TiMES (Apr. 18, 2013), http:!!
www.riverfronttimes.com/2013-04-18/news/sext-fiend/ [https://perma.cc/4QL3-AWU7].
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
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leaving him in December of 2009, Petrovic told her about these secret
recordings and that he had also saved all of her text messages to
262him. Petrovic threatened to publish this information online if M.B.
263did not agree to stay in the relationship.
After M.B. failed to acquiesce, Petrovic began an intense cam-
264
paign of harassment and abuse against M.B. He mailed dozens of
postcards to people in M.B.'s community, including her family mem-
bers, co-workers, and local businesses that featured a barely-dressed
,,265M.B. accompanied by epithets such as "whore. The postcards di-
rected recipients to a website that Petrovic had created, where he of-
fered twenty to thirty thousand pages of material about M.B., includ-
including links to dozens of images and videos of M.B. naked and
266
engaged in sex acts. Petrovic included links to pictures of M.B.'s
children (not fathered by Petrovic) as well as M.B.'s intimate text
messages, the picture of the pool of blood left by M.B.'s suicide at-
tempt, as well as M.B.'s contact information and the social security
267
numbers of her children. Petrovic also sent several packages con-
taining enlarged photographs of M.B. engaged in sexual acts to
268M.B.'s employer and family members. One of these packages was
269
opened and viewed by M.B.'s seven-year-old son. Petrovic was
convicted of four counts of interstate stalking and two counts of inter-
state extortionate threat.270
The Petrovic case is in many respects not unusual. As discussed
above, technology is a force multiplier for domestic abuse, enabling
abusers to exert unprecedented levels of control over their targets and
to crowdsource their surveillance campaigns.271 The case illustrates
how the greatest threat to privacy and security for women is more
likely to be former partners or acquaintances than the government.
Keylogging software allows abusers to see everything their targets
type into a search engine or email;272 GPS trackers lets abusers know
where their targets are at all hours of the day;273 and an entire sexual
humiliation industry has sprung up online fed by embittered exes and
262. See Petrovic, 701 F.3d at 852.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 853
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 849.
271. See Technology Abuse: Experiences of Survivors and Victim Service Agencies,
NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://nnedv.org/news/
4272 -new-survey-technology-abuse-experiences-of-survivors-and-victim-service-
agencie.html [https://perma.cc/JE5Z-N9HN].
272. See Shahani, supra note 115.
273. See id.
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274
misogynist consumers. What is unusual about the Petrovic case is
that the abuser was actually apprehended and punished. Victims fear
retaliation and escalation from their abusers, and the threat of sexual
exposure in the practice commonly referred to as "revenge porn" en-
sures that many victims will never reach out for help. Perpetrators
have incentives to engage in this conduct - whether a desire for
vengeance, social status, or profit - and little incentive to refrain be-
cause disclosing private sexual imagery without consent at the time of
275this case was not yet a crime in the majority of U.S. states.
M.B.'s gender made her uniquely vulnerable to multiple forms of
intimate surveillance, both low-tech and high-tech. Petrovic engaged
in in-person stalking of M.B. as well as secretly filming the two hav-
ing sex and using both electronic communications and the mail to dis-
tribute the footage, putting M.B. in fear for her physical safety and
wreaking havoc on her professional and personal life. Though M.B.
was able to obtain some justice in her case, the majority of women
subjected to multiple forms of intimate surveillance have had little or
no recourse.
V. CAUTIONARY TALES
The foregoing case studies highlight the way marginalized indi-
viduals experience multiple, insidious layers of surveillance. They are
the kinds of cases that should be, but are not, receiving widespread
public attention. They are the kinds of cases that should be, but are
not, inspiring calls for legal and political change. Instead, they are
relegated to the margins, while the experiences of elite and main-
stream society dominate the political and cultural conversation about
privacy and surveillance. The failure to pay adequate attention to the
way surveillance practices are shaped by race, class, and gender does
more than divert social attention away from cases like these; it also
distorts our fundamental understanding of privacy. This distortion
undermines even well-intentioned efforts to address social problems.
When the theory of privacy is incomplete or flawed, so will be the
practice. This Part offers two illustrations of how an underdeveloped,
elitist, interest-convergence approach to privacy and surveillance can
cause serious harm.
274. See Jill Filipovic, Revenge Porn is About Degrading Women, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
28, 2013, 17:23 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/28/revenge-
porn-degrades-women [https://perma.cc/5VPR-797D].
275. See Mary Anne Franks, The ACLUs Frat House Take on Revenge Porn,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/the-
aclus-frat-house-take_b_6980146.html [https://perma.cc/K75W-TG7W].
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A. Police Body Cameras
Longtime concerns over police misconduct and brutality, espe-
cially against racial minorities, reached a peak in the summer of 2014,
following the shooting of an unarmed teenager named Michael Brown
276by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The killing led to numer-
ous protests and sparked a national conversation about racism and
277
violence in law enforcement. The death of Brown was followed by
a series of other deaths, mostly of young black men, during police
confrontations or in police custody.278 The public outcry was reflected
in the social media hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, which quickly be-
came a social movement, engendering organized demonstrations, civil
rights investigations, institutional research, and political interven-
279tions.
One of the reforms that activists have frequently and loudly called
for, and municipalities have increasingly implemented, is mandatory
body cameras for police.280 Proponents argue that such cameras are an
essential tool for reducing police misconduct and brutality, with some
even arguing that they are the only tool that can save racial minorities
281from police violence. Many lawmakers and politicians have called
for mandatory body cameras for police,282 including Hillary Clin-
283ton. In May 2015, the Obama administration announced that it
276. See Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC (Aug. 10. 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/H7CW-Z9G6].
277. See id.
278. See Daniel Funke and Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TiMES (July 12, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/6FFQ-XVT].
279. See Josh Hafner, How Michael Brown 's Death, Two Years Ago, Pushed #Black-
LivesMatter into a Movement, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/08/08/how-michael-browns-death-
two-years-ago-pushed-blacklivesmatter-into-movement/884243 66/
[https://perma.cc/S6XM-D6EU]; Jay Caspian Kang, Our Demand is Simple: Stop Killing
Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/magazine/
our-demand-is-simple-stop-killing-us.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/DL5Q-ACCE].
280. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits,
68 ALA. L. REv. 395, 408-09 (2016).
281. See Nick Gillespie, Make Cops Wear Cameras, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://time.com/3111377/ferguson-police-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/JL85-KNVQ]; James
S. Muller, To Police the Police, Body Cameras are a Must, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-muller-body-camera-data-shows-unnecessary-
force-20150508-story.html [https://perma.cc/T4UY-8YD2].
282. See Kels Dayton & Bob Wilson, Lawmakers Vote to Spend $15 Million on Body
Cameras, WTNH.COM (June 29, 2015), http://wtnh.com/2015/06/29/lawmakers-vote-to-
spend- 15-million-on-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc/4WWC-CNTN]; Dennis Romboy,
Utah Lawmakers, Police Closer to Statewide Body Camera Rules, DESERET NEWS (Aug.
19, 2015), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865634886/Utah-lawmakers-police-closer-
to-statewide-body-camera-rules.html?pg=all [https://perma.cc/DV8Y-UA9W].
283. See Emily Schultheis, Hillary Clinton Calls for Body Cameras for All Police Offic-
ers Nationwide, NATIONAL JOURNAL (April 29, 2015), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/
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would be providing $20 million to police departments for body cam-
284
eras.
There are many compelling arguments in favor of mandatory po-
285lice body cameras. When a confrontation between a police officer
and a civilian results in the death of the latter, it can be very difficult
to determine what transpired before the use of deadly force. It is not
uncommon for police officers to lie about their encounters, and even
honest police officers may misremember events or fail to recognize
286the role implicit biases may have played in their actions. Without
video evidence, it is likely that many cases of police brutality would
287
never have come to light. Some studies have suggested that the use
of body cameras greatly reduces the use of force in police encounters
and the number of complaints lodged against police.288
However, there are many reasons to be cautious about the use of
police body cameras as well.289 Much of the video footage that proved
crucial to spotlighting instances of police brutality was shot by civil-
ians on cellphones or other devices, not by police cameras.290 There
are questions about how police officers can manipulate the technolo-
gy, from selectively turning cameras on and off to deceptively editing,
mishandling, or losing the footage. There are also serious issues to be
raised about the belief in the objectivity of video footage, especially
as research has shown that it is possible for two people to view the
2016-elections/hillary-clinton-calls-for-body-cameras-for-all-police-officers-nationwide-
20150429 [https://perma.cc/MZ7G-6BQ5].
284. See David Jackson, Obama Team Will Fund Police Body Camera Project, USA
TODAY (May 1, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/01/obama-
police-body-cameras-josh-earnest-baltimore/266965 17/ [https://perma.cc/KF5A-8SCS].
285. See MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW AND POLICY,
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND PRIVACY THREATS 5-7
(2015).
286. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2039 (2011) ("The science of implicit social cognition demonstrates that indi-
viduals of all races have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices that can
negatively and nonconsciously affect behavior towards blacks.").
287. For example, that Officer Michael Slager shot Walter Scott in the back as he ran
away. See Mark Berman, South Carolina Police Officer in Walter Scott Shooting Indicted
on Murder Charge, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/08/police-officer-who-shot-walter-scott-indicted-for-murder/
[https://perma.cc/2N2P-MHD].
288. See Fan, supra note 280, at 410-11; Alexandra Mateescu et al., Police Body-Worn
Cameras (Data & Soc'y Research Inst., Working Paper, 2015).
289. See Developments in the Law - Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1796 (2015)
("[B]ody cameras are a powerful - and indiscriminate - technology. Their proliferation
over the next decade will inevitably change the nature of policing in unexpected ways, quite
possibly to the detriment of the citizens the cameras are intended to protect.") [hereinafter
Developments].
290. See Mike Ludwig, Body Cameras Are Not Pointed at the Police: They're Pointed At
You, TRUTHOUT (May 24, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/30940-body-cameras-
are-not-pointed-at-the-police-they-re-pointed-at-you [https://perma.cc/KW9Q-GU24] ("'It's
bystander and civilian video, along with popular uprisings, that brought the issue of police
brutality and murder to the national stage - not police body cameras."').
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same video evidence and arrive at completely different conclusions
291
about what transpired. Some studies have shown that police use of
force actually increased following the implementation of body camer-
292
as.
With regard to the concerns of this Article, there is yet another
reason to hesitate, which has to do with the privacy and surveillance
implications of mandatory police body cameras. Many well-meaning
lawmakers, activists, and members of the general public do not seem
particularly attentive to the fact that no matter how benign or socially
useful, police cameras are a powerful form of surveillance that have
the potential to jeopardize the privacy of individuals at their most vul-
nerable. As noted in a 2015 Harvard Law Review article, "although
police body cameras have the potential to benefit citizens and officers
alike, they nevertheless represent another substantial step toward a
,293
surveillance state." As Wade Henderson, CEO of the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, put it in a Senate subcommit-
tee hearing on police body cameras: "[B]ody-worn cameras won't be
operated by concerned citizens and won't be recording officers. They
,,294
will instead be directed at members of the community. Henderson
went on to warn that:
body cameras would exacerbate the dramatic dispari-
ties in how different communities are policed, if the
technology becomes a 'multiuse surveillance tool'
for law enforcement. . . . [F]acial recognition and
other biometric technologies, along with body cam-
eras, . . . would give law enforcement unprecedented
abilities to peer into heavily policed neighborhoods,
291. See BLITZ, supra note 285, at 7-8; Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 838,
841 (2009); Mateescu et al., supra note 288, at 26 ("Existing biases can... manifest in
interpretation of body-worn camera footage. Various studies have highlighted the biases that
shape people's judgments and how interpersonal interactions can draw on conscious and
unconscious stereotypes.").
292. See Jacob Gershman, Study Links Police Bodycams to Increase in Shooting Deaths,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/08/12/study-links-police-
bodycams-to-increase-in-shooting-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/CY3T-7G38]; Chris Martin,
San Diego Police Are Using Body Cameras But Their Impact on Police Force May Not Be
As Expected, INDEPENDENT JOURNAL REVIEW (Sept. 2015), http://ijr.com/2015/09/424065-
san-diego-police-using-body-cameras-devices-curbing-use-force-cops-city/
[https://perma.cc/7JZE-WF2R] ("Interdepartmental research shows that during that 12-
month period when body cameras were in use, instances of some types of force by San
Diego police officers actually rose by 10%.").
293. See Developments, supra note 289, at 1811.
294. Ludwig, supra note 290.
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where stationary surveillance cameras are already
abundant.295
As the discussion above detailed, black bodies, poor bodies, and
female bodies have historically been disproportionately subjected to
surveillance, often in the service of law enforcement or other forms of
state monitoring. Black men, especially poor black men, are over-
represented in the criminal justice system, from racial profiling to in-
vestigations, convictions to probation. Always-on recording capacity
in law enforcement will create opportunities to intimidate vulnerable
communities who fear interaction with police even if they are engaged
in no wrongdoing. As noted in a February 2015 Working Paper by the
Data & Society Research Institute, police departments have signifi-
296
cant discretion when deciding how, when, and whom to record, and
this discretion can easily be used in a discriminatory fashion. There is
good reason to fear that the injustices that underpin the criminal jus-
297tice system will only be replicated and amplified by technology.
There are also serious privacy questions to be considered regarding
the consent of the civilians being recorded, who can access the foot-
age, how the footage will be stored, and how the footage will be
298
used. One police chief in Washington, concerned that the state's
public records law would force him to disclose footage from body
299
cameras, decided not to purchase body cameras for his officers.
"Our view is we don't want to be part of violating people's privacy
for commercial or voyeuristic reasons. Everyone's worst day is now
going to be put on YouTube for eternity."300
The concern about voyeurism is underscored by the fact that at
least some police officers are more than happy to use technology to
boast of their racism, their use of force, or to simply express their con-
tempt for civilians. In March 2015, the FBI opened an investigation
into four Fort Lauderdale police officers who shared a mock movie
trailer, created by one of the officers, that used racial slurs, "showed a
dog attacking a black man[,] . . . depicted President Obama with gold
295. Id.
296. See Mateescu et al., supra note 288, at 9-11.
297. See Ludwig, supra note 290 ("Malkia Cyril, a prominent civil rights activist and di-
rector of the Center for Media Justice, said body cameras are no substitute for the kind of
comprehensive reforms needed to curb police violence and hold cops accountable. 'Police
body cameras are an unproven technology to collect evidence .. . .But this technology can't
be relied upon to ensure police accountability that we, as a nation, have failed to imple-
ment."').
298. See Mateescu et al., supra note 288, at 9-11.
299. Timothy Williams, Downside ofPolice Body Cameras: Your Arrest Hits YouTube,
N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/us/downside-of-police-
body-cameras-your-arrest-hits-youtube.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/EPM7-DXQ6].
300. Id.
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teeth and included Ku Klux Klan imagery." 30' In May 2015, a photo
surfaced of two rifle-bearing Chicago police officers posing with a
302black suspect on whose head they had placed deer antlers. In Au-
gust 2015, the Washington Post reported that the Ser-
geants Benevolent Association in New York had begun posting
photographs of "signs of disorder" to Flickr, a photo-sharing site:
"The cumulative effect makes it look a lot like the police, if they can't
clean up the homeless, are mocking them instead. . . . The images,
scrolling down for several pages, zoom in on New Yorkers at their
,,303
worst moments and when they're most vulnerable. One commen-
tator, reflecting on the routine exposure to graphic footage of the
deaths of black men at the hands of police, cautions:
Yes, we should celebrate that even though an un-
armed black man was killed, his killing was caught
on film, so there's a better shot at justice and closure.
But I'm trying desperately to make sense of why
watching and sharing the video that tore his mother's
heart to pieces is as normal as making your latest In-
stagram post.... In a world where we are inundated
with explicit content, watching black men die on
camera provides a thrill that America thought she
lost when popular lynchings ended. 304
Adding to the gravity of these concerns is the lack of attention
paid to the prevalence of sexism and gendered violence in law en-
forcement. U.S. law enforcement is a hyper-masculine institution,
heavily dominated by men and by rigid gender stereotypes.305 Studies
indicate that the families of police officers are two to four times more
301. Caitlin MacNeal, FBI Looking into Florida Cops Tied to Racist Video Depiction of
Obama, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 23, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/
fort-lauderdale-police-racist-messages [https://perma.cc/QXX6-WVNQ].
302. Travis Gettys, Photo Shows Rifle-Toting Chicago Cops Posing with a Black Drug
Suspect Like a Hunting Trophy, RAW STORY (May 27, 2015),
http://www.rawstory.com/2015/05/photo-shows-rifle-toting-chicago-cops-posing-with-a-
black-drug-suspect-like-a-hunting-trophy/ [https://perma.cc/24UR-888G].
303. Emily Badger, Police Are Posting Photos Online ofNew Yorkers at Their Most Vul-
nerable, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/
wp/2015/08/13/police-are-posting-photos-online-of-new-yorkers-at-their-most-vulnerable/
[https://perma.cc/2CKQ-FLYS].
304. Jade E. Davis, Black Men Being Killed is the New Girls Gone Wild, MEDIUM (Apr.
10, 2015), https://medium.com/matter/black-men-being-killed-is-the-new-girls-gone-wild-
da5cl5Ob70c4 [https://perma.cc/8Z6M-LLKN].
305. See Mary Anne Case, Police Mistakes in Ferguson Involve Gender as Well as Race,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-
case/police-mistakes-in-fergusb_5793494.html [https://perma.cc/YBH9-6KQ6].
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likely to experience domestic violence than the general population.306
The second most-reported form of police misconduct, after the use of
excessive force, is sexual assault: "[S]exual assault rates are signifi-
cantly higher for police when compared to the general population." 307
There is good reason to be concerned about how misogynist law en-
forcement officers will use surveillance tools against women, espe-
cially for the purpose of sexual exploitation. One particularly horrific
illustration of police sexual assault came to light in 2014, when Okla-
homa City police officer Daniel Holtzclaw was charged with sexually
assaulting 13 women while on duty.308 Holtzclaw "forced women
whom he had threatened to arrest or physically harm to perform vari-
ous sex acts while he was on patrol. The females ranged in age from
17 to 58 and included a 57-year-old grandmother who was allegedly
,309forced to perform oral sex on him.
In January 2015, it was reported that Oklahoma City Police De-
partment would begin a one-hundred-camera pilot program. 3 10 The
mainstream media did not question whether the issue of sexual assault
by police officers might complicate the endorsement of police body
cameras as the solution to misconduct; in fact, the few outlets that
even acknowledged the issue of police sexual assault seemed confi-
dent that body cameras were the solution to this problem as well.311
This insouciance is alarming. What accounts for the confidence that if
Daniel Holtzclaw had been wearing a body camera, it would have
inhibited rather than emboldened him?312 A police officer who sexual-
306. Zoe Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren't Talking About, THE NATION (Aug.
27, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about/
[https://perma.cc/YR28-9S99].
307. Id.
308. See Marc Weinreich, Oklahoma Police Lieutenant Faces Life Sentence as List ofAl-
leged Victims Grows to 13, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/police-lieutenant-faces-life-sentence-victims-list-
grows-article-1.2000120 [https://perma.cc/YUL8-C4LB].
309. In 2015, Holtzclaw was convicted of 18 of the 36 sexual assault charges levied
against him and sentenced to 263 years. See Sarah Larimer, Disgraced Ex-Cop Daniel
Holtzclaw Sentenced to 263 Years for On-Duty Rapes, Sexual Assaults, WASH. POST (Jan.
22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/21/disgraced-ex-
officer-daniel-holtzclaw-to-be-sentenced-after-sex-crimes-
conviction/?utmterm=.739367b8fffe [https://perma.cc/C9FQ-82CD].
310. William Crum, Oklahoma City Police to Test Body Cameras for Police Officers,
THE OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 12, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5384108 [https://perma.cc/
S98G-QAL5].
311. See Arrest of OKC Officer Highlights the Benefits of Body Cameras, NEWS9.COM
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.news9.com/story/26345123/arrest-of-okc-officer-highlights-
benefits-of-body-cameras [https://perma.cc/4ZVH-H8PA].
312. In 2015, the Associated Press concluded a yearlong investigation into law enforce-
ment sexual abuse, uncovering more than 1000 officers who lost their licenses for rape and
sexual misconduct. One of these men, Officer Sergio Alvarez, had been reprimanded for
failing to use his audio-visual recording unit during detentions. After Alvarez was arrested
for sexual assault, investigators discovered that he had worn a personal camera during some
of the assaults. Martha Irvine & Scott Smith, AP: Officer Sex Cases Plagued by Lax Super-
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ly assaults multiple women while on duty must feel confident that his
victims will not report him; a police officer armed with a camera that
he controls will have additional leverage. How many women will be
willing to report a sexual assault by a police officer if they know the
assault has been captured on film and could be exposed to family, co-
workers, and the general public? The belief that the footage would
show unambiguous evidence of assault and would therefore serve the
victim's interests rather than the perpetrator's is naive for at least two
reasons. First, viewers' interpretations of wrongdoing in video footage
can vary dramatically, especially when sexual, racial, or other stereo-
types are at work. The appearance of consent can also be coerced,
especially by someone with a gun and a badge. Second, even if a vid-
eo shows clear evidence of assault, this would be small comfort to
victims living in a society where sexual assault victims are routinely
exposed, humiliated, and shamed. To report any crime, particularly a
sexual crime, is to sacrifice intimate privacy in a way that cannot be
undone and cannot be controlled.
Failing to consider the impact that any form of surveillance
even ostensibly benign surveillance - will have on marginalized in-
dividuals can result in disastrous consequences for those individuals,
as well for society as a whole. Attentiveness to intersectionality, in
both Crenshaw's sense of multiple forms of subordination and in the
sense of multiple forms of surveillance, is crucial.
B. Revenge Porn
Civil liberties groups often hold themselves out as the watchdogs
of privacy. The ACLU, for example, states that it is dedicated to "ex-
pand[ing] the right to privacy, increas[ing] the control that individuals
have over their personal information, and ensur[ing] that civil liberties
are enhanced rather than compromised by new advances in science
and technology."313 In many ways, the ACLU has made good on this
claim. It has urged the Federal Trade Commission to pursue data bro-
kers who buy and sell information about consumers,314 written a letter
of support for the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as a
vision, Policies, Associated Press (Nov. 2, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
d6701aa27d894889b5c3c599d8d9f467/ap-officer-sex-cases-plagued-lax-supervision-
policies [https://perma.cc/L6HB-8JNW].
313. Privacy & Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology
[https://perma.cc/T7R9-XNVH].
314. Chris Calabrese, Federal Trade Commission Needs to Move Beyond Reports When
It Comes to Data Brokers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/
federal-trade-commission-needs-move-beyond-reports-when-it-comes-data
[https://perma.cc/YQ5W-5CXQ].
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means of protecting "extremely personal sensitive information," 315
and encouraged Congress to pass legislation that would require patient
consent for the use of medical records for "secondary purposes."316
However, the ACLU's approach to sexual privacy - an issue of ever-
increasing urgency, particularly for women - has been the opposite
of protective. The ACLU has taken a strangely hostile stance on the
issue of sexual privacy by singling out revenge porn laws for at-
tack. 317
In 2012, the problem of nonconsensual pornography, often mis-
leadingly referred to as "revenge porn," began to receive mainstream
attention. Nonconsensual pornography refers to sexually explicit im-
ages disclosed without consent and for no legitimate purpose. 318 The
term includes material obtained by hidden cameras, consensually ex-
changed images within a confidential relationship, stolen photos, and
recordings of sexual assaults. Nonconsensual pornography often plays
a role in intimate partner violence, with abusers using the threat of
disclosure to keep their partners from leaving or reporting abuse to
law enforcement. 319 Traffickers and pimps also use nonconsensual
320pornography to trap unwilling individuals in the sex trade. It is be-
coming increasingly common for rapists to record their attacks not
only to further humiliate their victims but also to discourage victims
321from reporting sexual assaults.
Nonconsensual pornography can cause immediate and irreversi-
ble harm. Abusers, hackers, and traffickers can make an explicit im-
age of a victim accessible to thousands, even millions of people
merely by uploading it to a website. That image can go viral in
315.ACLU Letter to the Senate Urging Support of S. 358, the "Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, " ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-senate-
urging-support-s-3 5 8-genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act-2007 [https://perma.cc/
QV66-7W5W].
316. ACLU Urges Congress to Define Medical Privacy as Patient Control ofElectronic
Health Records, ACLU (July 23, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-urges-congress-
define-medical-privacy-patient-control-electronic-health-records [https://perma.cc/Z8YR-
W228].
317. See Franks, supra note 275.
318. See Citron & Franks, supra note 113, at 346.
319. See Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim ofRevenge Porn, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 19,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-porn-victim-
maryland-law-change [https://perma.cc/H75C-KN3X]; Jack Simpson, Revenge Porn: What
Is It and How Widespread Is the Problem?, THE INDEPENDENT ( July 2, 2014), http:!!
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/what-is-revenge-porn-958025 1.html
[https://perma.cc/25AA-S54L].
320. See Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 799, 818 (2008); Marion Brooks, The World ofHuman Trafficking: One Wom-
an's Story, NBC CHICAGO (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/
human-trafficking-alex-campbell-192415731.html [https://perma.cc/8DPG-E8Y7].
321. Tara Culp-Ressler, 16-Year-Old's Rape Goes Viral on Twitter, THINK PROGRESS
(July 10, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/07/10/3458564/rape-viral-social-
media-jada/ [https://perma.cc/U5F4-RTJV].
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minutes or even seconds, at which point it can dominate the search
322
engine results for the victim's name. The image can also make its
way to the victim's family, employer, co-workers, and peers. Victims
suffer extreme psychological distress, depression, and anxiety. They
frequently experience threats of sexual assault, stalking, and harass-
323 324
ment and are often fired from jobs or forced to change schools.
325Some victims have committed suicide. Nonconsensual pornography
is not restricted to female victims, although available evidence to date
indicates that the majority of victims are women and girls, and that
326
women and girls face more serious fallout.
While nonconsensual pornography is not a new phenomenon,
technology has accelerated its occurrence and impact. Technology
makes it possible for abusers to crowdsource their harassment and has
helped create a market for voyeuristic content. The Internet makes it
possible for dedicated revenge porn sites and other forums to openly
solicit private, intimate images and expose them to millions of view-
327
ers, while allowing the posters themselves to hide in the shadows.
Thousands of websites feature revenge porn,328 and intimate material
is also widely distributed without consent through social media, blogs,
emails, and texts.
Before 2013, almost no laws in the U.S. explicitly addressed this
329invasion of sexual privacy, even as almost every other form of pri-
vacy - including financial, medical, and data privacy - have ob-
tained legal and socially sanctioned protection. While some existing
voyeurism, surveillance, and computer hacking laws prohibit the ob-
servation and recording of individuals in states of undress or engaged
in sexual activity without consent, the nonconsensual disclosure of
intimate images has been, until very recently, largely unregulated by
the law.
By March 2017, due in large part to the efforts of the Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative (for which I serve as Vice-President and Legislative
and Tech Policy Director), the social and legal landscape of the issue
322. See Citron & Franks, supra note 113, at 350.
323. See Ariel Ronneburger, Note, Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal Reme-
dyfor Victims ofPorn 2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 8-9 (2009).
324. See Citron & Franks, supra note 113, at 350.
325. Emily Bazelon, Another Sexting Tragedy, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2013), http:!!
www.slate.com/articles/doublex/doublex/2013/04/audriepott and rehtaehjarsonshow
shouldthe legal systemtreatnonconsensual.html [https://perma.cc/6UKH-LGBU].
326. See Citron & Franks, supra note 113, at 347-48.
327. Dylan Love, It Will Be Hard to Stop the Rise of Revenge Porn, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
8, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-pom-2013-2 [https://perma.cc/8R7T-
X6LM].
328. Revenge Porn: Misery Merchants, THE ECONOMIST (July 5, 2014), http:!!
www.economist.com/news/intemational/21606307-how-should-online-publication-explicit-
images-without-their-subjects-consent-be [https://perma.cc/K4TB-5NC7].
329. See Mary Anne Franks, Revenge Porn Reform: A View From the Front Lines, 69
FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2017).
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had been transformed.330 As of this writing, several major social me-
dia platforms have banned nonconsensual pornography; furthermore,
thirty-six states have passed laws directly aimed at the practice,33 '
while several others are in the process of passing legislation; and fi-
nally, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA) introduced a bipartisan
federal criminal bill against the practice, called the Intimate Privacy
332Protection Act, in July 2016. But as support for victims and for leg-
islative reform has grown, so has opposition to reform, most vocifer-
ously from the ACLU.
When the issue first began receiving extensive public attention,
ACLU representatives implied that no criminal law aimed at prohibit-
ing the nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit images was
compatible with the First Amendment.333 While the organization
abandoned this claim fairly quickly, it continued to attack legislative
efforts to address the problem. The organization penned letters and
gave testimony asserting that the definition of the crime as proposed
by victim advocates, legal experts, and democratically elected state
lawmakers should be set aside in favor of the ACLU's own definition,
to wit:
(1) [A] person who was or is in an intimate relation-
ship with another person and who, (2) during and as
a result of that relationship, obtained a recognizable
image of such other person in a state of nudity, (3)
where such other person had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and an understanding that such image
would remain private, (4) to display such image (5)
without the consent of such other person, (6) with the
intent to harass, humiliate, embarrass, or otherwise
harm such other person, and (7) where there is no
public or newsworthy purpose for the display.334
330. Id. at 15, 21-24.
331. Id. at 4, 22-23.
332. Mary Anne Franks, How to Defeat Revenge Porn': First, Recognize it'sAbout Pri-
vacy, not Revenge, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
mary-anne-franks/how-to-defeat-revenge-pomb 7624900.html [https://perma.cc/6YB7-
5FQF].
333. CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, BILL ANALYSIS SB 255, at 5 (2013),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0251-
0300/sb 255 cfa 20130703 114233 sen floor.html [https://perma.cc/WRB9-GH9F] ("The
ACLU states, 'The posting of otherwise lawful speech or images even if offensive or emo-
tionally distressing is constitutionally protected. The speech must constitute a true threat or
violate another otherwise lawful criminal law, such as stalking or harassment statute, in
order to be made illegal."').
334. See Franks, supra note 275.
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How the ACLU arrived at this particular definition or why this defini-
tion is superior to other definitions has never been made clear.
The ACLU's definition of the crime of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy rests on an exceedingly narrow conception of privacy, one that is
at odds with fairly uncontroversial criminal legislation regarding other
forms of private information. Both state and federal criminal laws
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of materials such as medical rec-
ords,335 financial data,336 and cell phone usage information.337 None of
these statutes require that perpetrators act with the intent to harass
their victims, and certainly none require that the perpetrator and vic-
tim be intimate partners. The ACLU clearly recognizes that protecting
privacy in these contexts, without "intent to harass" requirements,
does not violate the First Amendment.338 The privacy measures spear-
headed by the ACLU itself emphasize the right of individuals not to
have their private information disclosed without consent, without any
reference to motive. 339 While the ACLU does not claim that people
have a First Amendment right to disclose medical records, social se-
curity numbers, or geolocation data of others without consent, it does
claim that there is a First Amendment right to disclose naked photos
and sex videos without consent. It is difficult to understand why the
ACLU treats a form of privacy violation that disproportionately af-
fects women differently from other privacy violations.
It is an unfortunate reality that women are experts in surveillance.
From street harassment to sexual assault, stalking to limitations on
reproductive rights, surveillance is a part of most women's daily lives.
Sexual surveillance has devastating consequences on victims' free-
dom of intimate association, their participation in political, social, and
cultural life, their educational and professional opportunities, and the
development of their personalities. Those who discount the gravity of
the harms of intimate surveillance - who indeed refuse to even rec-
ognize it as such and attempt to downgrade it to harassing or distress-
ing behavior - reveal that their allegiance is not to privacy, but to the
interests of those who enjoy and profit from invading privacy. Given
that men make up the majority of perpetrators of intimate surveillance
and women make up the majority of victims, this also means alle-
giance to the interests of men over the interests of women.
335. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2010).
336. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01 (West 2015).
337. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2015).
338. The ACLU's position also rests on a deeply flawed understanding of the First
Amendment. See Franks, supra note 275.
339. See Mary Anne Franks, It's Time for Congress to Protect Intimate Privacy,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/
revenge-porn-intimate-privacy-protection-act b1 11034998.html [https://perma.cc/3KJB-
GY33].
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Failing to acknowledge the multiple ways in which women and
girls experience and are burdened by surveillance promotes male sex-
ual entitlement over female autonomy. Characterizing invasions of
privacy as free speech and attempts to protect privacy as censorship
are not neutral or principled positions. It discounts the privacy inter-
ests of women in favor of the entertainment and profit interests of
men, and, as such, is a profoundly undemocratic approach to privacy.
C. A Tale of Two Cases: From Terry to Papachristou
It is possible to develop a sophisticated and consistent approach
to privacy that does not devalue the experience of marginalized popu-
lations. The contrast between two Supreme Court cases, Terry v.
Ohio340 and Papachristou v. Jacksonville341 can provide a blueprint
for the move from privileged interests to democratic interests.
The Court in Terry famously established that the practice of "stop
and frisk," while subject to Fourth Amendment analysis, did not re-
342quire probable cause. Officer McFadden, a white officer, stopped
and searched three men, two of whom were black, after observing
them walk past a store window and peer into it several times. 343
McFadden was not able to say why he first started monitoring Terry
and Chilton except that "they just didn't look right to me."344 The
Court found that what would later be termed "reasonable suspicion"
345
was a sufficient basis for a stop and frisk. The Court's decision was
delivered in the wake of riots that had followed the assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr. earlier that year.346 The civil rights movement
had unleashed a wave of sit-ins, protests, and demonstrations, and law
enforcement often responded with brutal force. Chief Justice Earl
Warren took note of the unrest, referring to the "wholesale harassment
by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, complain." 347 While he invoked the real-
ity of racial surveillance, in the next breath he seemed to ignore it,
asserting that this harassment cannot be deterred by the primary rem-
edy for Fourth Amendment violations: namely, the exclusionary
rule. 348 The rule, Justice Warren found, "is powerless to deter inva-
sions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either
340. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
341. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
342. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 2-3.
343. Id. at 1.
344. Id. at 5.
345. See id. at 30-3 1; id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
346. See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (1994).
347. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
348. Id. at 14-15.
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have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful pros-
ecution in the interest of serving some other goal." 349 This curious
formulation suggests that the Court did not rule against law enforce-
ment in this case in part because doing so would not deter police who
are motivated by prejudice. While it may be true that suppressing the
evidence would not, standing alone, discourage law enforcement of-
ficers from engaging in racist practices, it does not follow that the
Court could not or should not have found the search and seizure un-
constitutional.
The lone dissenter in Terry, Justice Douglas, condemned the ma-
jority opinion as "a long step down the totalitarian path." 350 Four
years later, Justice Douglas authored the majority opinion in Papa-
christon, striking down a Florida anti-vagrancy statute as unconstitu-
tional. 351 The ordinance criminalized an impressive range of conduct
and persons, including "persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers,
,352[and] disorderly persons .... " In declaring the statute overly broad
and vague, Justice Douglas took note of two points in particular. First,
that the freedom to engage in the kinds of activities outlined in the
statute is central to the development of the human personality:
"[T]hese activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we
have known them. . . . They have encouraged lives of high spirits ra-
ther than hushed, suffocating silence."353 Second, he observed that the
discretion granted to law enforcement through these vague terms
would no doubt result in disproportionate targeting of the marginal-
ized:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of
the ordinance - poor people, nonconformists, dis-
senters, idlers - may be required to comport them-
selves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate
by the . . . police and the courts. . . . It results in a re-
gime in which the poor and the unpopular are per-
mitted to "stand on a public sidewalk" . .. only at the
whim of any police officer.354
Justice Douglas's opinion in Papachristou is in many ways the
inverse of Chief Justice Warren's in Terry. Terry gave the green light
for vague intuitions of law enforcement officers to serve as justifica-
349. Id. at 14.
350. Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
351. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972).
352. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156-57 n.1.
353. Id. at 164.
354. Id. at 170 (citation omitted).
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tion for invasive surveillance and invoked the existence of prejudice
against a marginalized group only to ignore its constitutional signifi-
cance. Papachristou rejected the attempt of law enforcement to broad-
ly criminalize the freedom of movement and invoked prejudice
against marginalized groups as a matter of deep constitutional signifi-
cance. The contrast between these two cases offers important lessons
about how we can ensure that our most fiercely defended rights are
grounded in the experience of those who have the most to lose.
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRATIC PRIVACY
A 2014 New York Times article on facial recognition technology
focused on the concerns of one of the technology's pioneers, Joseph J.
Atick, that face-matching could have disastrous consequences for pri-
vacy:
Online, we are all tracked. But to Dr. Atick, the
street remains a haven, and he frets that he may have
abetted a technology that could upend the social or-
der. Face-matching today could enable mass surveil-
lance, "basically robbing everyone of their
anonymity," he says, and inhibit people's normal be-
havior outside their homes. Pointing to the intelli-
gence documents made public by Edward J.
Snowden, he adds that once companies amass con-
sumers' facial data, government agencies might ob-
tain access to it, too.355
The obliviousness to race, gender, and class in this passage is remark-
able. "Online, we are all tracked" of course assumes that "we" are all
online, despite the fact that online access is a privilege not accessible
to many people. 356 "[T]he street remains a haven" - for whom? Not
to women, young minority men, or homeless individuals, for whom
"the street" offers daily harassment, threats, and unwanted scrutiny.
Face-matching technology deployed on the street might rob "every-
one" of their anonymity - that would be people who are not already
effectively deprived of anonymity due to databases tracking criminal
records, welfare rolls, or child support delinquency, or deprived ano-
355. Natasha Singer, Never Forgetting a Face, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-forgetting-a-face.html?_r-O
[https://perma.cc/WPU7-DM2K].
356. See Astra Taylor, The Internet's Destructive Gender Gap: Why the Web Can't
Abandon Its Misogyny, SALON (April 10, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/04/10/
the internets destructive gender gap why the web cant abandonitsmisogynypartner/
[https://perma.cc/97RZ-TSFM].
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nymity through pretextual policing, or through stalking and harass-
ment. This new technology will "inhibit people's normal behavior
outside of their homes" - that is, those of us with homes and who are
not already adapting our clothes, routes to work, facial expressions, or
gait.35 7 And finally, Atick says that "government agencies might ob-
tain access" to our facial data, as if the government indisputably posed
the greatest threat to citizens, a presumption that thousands of victims
of racist aggression, public harassment, and domestic violence likely
would not share.
This passage is a striking example of how the dominant privacy
narrative, in focusing on fairly recent historical developments mostly
involving state-sponsored threats to the informational privacy interests
of mainstream and elite society, ignores the very long and destructive
history of the surveillance of marginalized bodies, in particular black
bodies, poor bodies, and female bodies. This focus not only erases the
very real harms inflicted on these groups, but also warps the concep-
tion of surveillance itself and jeopardizes the privacy rights of all. If
left unaddressed, these distortions will undermine any true progress
on the question of privacy and how to protect it.
The foregoing is not intended to establish a hierarchy of the sur-
veillance harms of one group over another, or to suggest that viola-
tions of informational privacy are trivial compared to violations of
physical and decisional privacy. Rather, it is meant to encourage the
potential for empathy and reflection presented by the democratization
of surveillance. Mainstream society's relatively recent and, in many
cases, relatively superficial encounter with the chilling effects of sur-
veillance provides an opportunity to throw off historical complacency
regarding the regulation of marginalized groups and to develop truly
inclusive privacy protections. If society fails to do so, and responds
only to the threat that a constrained view of surveillance poses to
those with power and privilege, then there will be no real develop-
ment or real progress with regard to privacy. Such an interest-
convergence approach to privacy will parallel the limitations of an
interest-convergence approach to racial equality.358 We will be left
with an anemic defense of anemic privacy rights that will have little
chance of weathering the next great threat to expression and autono-
my.
Kimberle Crenshaw's intersectional approach can function as a
counter to the limitations of interest convergence described by Bell.
Intersectionality is not only a way of understanding oppression and
focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable, but also a way to im-
357. See Stacey Patton, Is Looking Black a Crime?, DAME MAGAZINE ( Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.damemagazine.com/2015/01/12/looking-black-crime [https://perma.cc/P8LN-
KNEW].
358. See Bell, supra note 7, at 528.
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prove society as a whole. When we address "the needs and problems
of those who are most disadvantaged . . , then others who are singu-
larly disadvantaged would also benefit."359 When we build our sys-
tems around the experiences of the most vulnerable, we improve the
outcomes for everyone. As Crenshaw eloquently expressed it, "When
they enter, we all enter." 360 We can respond to the democratization of
surveillance by democratizing privacy, by structuring it around the
needs and interests of those who suffer the most. When they have pri-
vacy, we all have privacy.
359. Crenshaw, supra note 121, at 167.
360. Id.
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